| 000 | 00000nam c2200205 c 4500 | |
| 001 | 000046127123 | |
| 005 | 20230714172801 | |
| 007 | ta | |
| 008 | 220704s2022 ulkd bmAC 000c eng | |
| 040 | ▼a 211009 ▼c 211009 ▼d 211009 | |
| 085 | 0 | ▼a 0510 ▼2 KDCP |
| 090 | ▼a 0510 ▼b 6B2 ▼c 2334 | |
| 100 | 1 | ▼a Kim, Min Jae |
| 245 | 1 0 | ▼a Outside director tenure limit and their voting behavior / ▼d Kim Min Jae |
| 260 | ▼a Seoul : ▼b Graduate School, Korea University, ▼c 2022 | |
| 300 | ▼a 36장 : ▼b 도표 ; ▼c 26 cm | |
| 500 | ▼a 지도교수: 김우찬 | |
| 500 | ▼a 부록수록 | |
| 502 | 0 | ▼a 학위논문(석사)-- ▼b 고려대학교 대학원, ▼c 경영학과, ▼d 2022. 8 |
| 504 | ▼a 참고문헌: 장 24-26 | |
| 530 | ▼a PDF 파일로도 이용가능; ▼c Requires PDF file reader(application/pdf) | |
| 653 | ▼a Director Voting ▼a Dissent ▼a Proposal Rejection ▼a Monitoring Effectiveness ▼a Director Tenure | |
| 776 | 0 | ▼t Outside Director Tenure Limit and Their Voting Behavior ▼w (DCOLL211009)000000268444 |
| 900 | 1 0 | ▼a 김우찬, ▼g 金佑燦, ▼d 1967-, ▼e 지도교수 ▼0 AUTH(211009)112382 |
| 945 | ▼a ITMT |
Electronic Information
| No. | Title | Service |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Outside director tenure limit and their voting behavior (22회 열람) |
View PDF Abstract Table of Contents |
Holdings Information
| No. | Location | Call Number | Accession No. | Availability | Due Date | Make a Reservation | Service |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| No. 1 | Location Centennial Digital Library/Thesis/ | Call Number 0510 6B2 2334 | Accession No. 163083000 | Availability Available | Due Date | Make a Reservation | Service |
| No. 2 | Location Centennial Digital Library/Thesis/ | Call Number 0510 6B2 2334 | Accession No. 163083001 | Availability Available | Due Date | Make a Reservation | Service |
Contents information
Abstract
This paper examines whether a director’s tenure affects their ability to make independent and effective board monitoring decisions. The relationship is tested around the recently introduced tenure limit regulation in Korea, as many of the affected directors were forced to resign. Long-tenured directors are shown to dissent significantly less than short-tenured directors prior to the enactment and those that replaced them. Moreover, there is strong evidence that directors serving their second term show a stronger inclination to dissent after the rule change as they can no longer be nominated. These findings exploit the compromises of extended outside director tenure on governance practices by explicitly tying director voting behavior to monitoring effectiveness.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction 1 2. Outside Director System in Korea 4 3. Literature review and hypothesis development 6 3-1. Literature review 6 3-2. Hypotheses development 9 4. Data and methodology 11 4-1. Korean voting data 11 4-2. Sample and variable definition 12 4-3. Methodology 13 5. Empirical results 17 5-1. Summary statistics 17 5-2. Voting behavior of long-tenured directors 18 5-3. Voting behavior between different terms 21 6. Conclusion 22
