HOME > 상세정보

상세정보

Outside director tenure limit and their voting behavior

Outside director tenure limit and their voting behavior

자료유형
학위논문
개인저자
Kim, Min Jae
서명 / 저자사항
Outside director tenure limit and their voting behavior / Kim Min Jae
발행사항
Seoul :   Graduate School, Korea University,   2022  
형태사항
36장 : 도표 ; 26 cm
기타형태 저록
Outside Director Tenure Limit and Their Voting Behavior   (DCOLL211009)000000268444  
학위논문주기
학위논문(석사)-- 고려대학교 대학원, 경영학과, 2022. 8
학과코드
0510   6B2   2334  
일반주기
지도교수: 김우찬  
부록수록  
서지주기
참고문헌: 장 24-26
이용가능한 다른형태자료
PDF 파일로도 이용가능;   Requires PDF file reader(application/pdf)  
비통제주제어
Director Voting, Dissent, Proposal Rejection, Monitoring Effectiveness, Director Tenure,,
000 00000nam c2200205 c 4500
001 000046127123
005 20230714172801
007 ta
008 220704s2022 ulkd bmAC 000c eng
040 ▼a 211009 ▼c 211009 ▼d 211009
085 0 ▼a 0510 ▼2 KDCP
090 ▼a 0510 ▼b 6B2 ▼c 2334
100 1 ▼a Kim, Min Jae
245 1 0 ▼a Outside director tenure limit and their voting behavior / ▼d Kim Min Jae
260 ▼a Seoul : ▼b Graduate School, Korea University, ▼c 2022
300 ▼a 36장 : ▼b 도표 ; ▼c 26 cm
500 ▼a 지도교수: 김우찬
500 ▼a 부록수록
502 0 ▼a 학위논문(석사)-- ▼b 고려대학교 대학원, ▼c 경영학과, ▼d 2022. 8
504 ▼a 참고문헌: 장 24-26
530 ▼a PDF 파일로도 이용가능; ▼c Requires PDF file reader(application/pdf)
653 ▼a Director Voting ▼a Dissent ▼a Proposal Rejection ▼a Monitoring Effectiveness ▼a Director Tenure
776 0 ▼t Outside Director Tenure Limit and Their Voting Behavior ▼w (DCOLL211009)000000268444
900 1 0 ▼a 김우찬, ▼g 金佑燦, ▼d 1967-, ▼e 지도교수 ▼0 AUTH(211009)112382
945 ▼a ITMT

전자정보

No. 원문명 서비스
1
Outside director tenure limit and their voting behavior (29회 열람)
PDF 초록 목차

소장정보

No. 소장처 청구기호 등록번호 도서상태 반납예정일 예약 서비스
No. 1 소장처 학술정보관(CDL)/B1 국제기구자료실(학위논문)/ 청구기호 0510 6B2 2334 등록번호 163083000 도서상태 대출가능 반납예정일 예약 서비스 B M
No. 2 소장처 학술정보관(CDL)/B1 국제기구자료실(학위논문)/ 청구기호 0510 6B2 2334 등록번호 163083001 도서상태 대출가능 반납예정일 예약 서비스 B M

컨텐츠정보

초록

This paper examines whether a director’s tenure affects their ability to make independent and effective board monitoring decisions. The relationship is tested around the recently introduced tenure limit regulation in Korea, as many of the affected directors were forced to resign. Long-tenured directors are shown to dissent significantly less than short-tenured directors prior to the enactment and those that replaced them. Moreover, there is strong evidence that directors serving their second term show a stronger inclination to dissent after the rule change as they can no longer be nominated. These findings exploit the compromises of extended outside director tenure on governance practices by explicitly tying director voting behavior to monitoring effectiveness.

목차

1. Introduction  1
2. Outside Director System in Korea   4
3. Literature review and hypothesis development   6
   3-1. Literature review   6
   3-2. Hypotheses development   9
4. Data and methodology   11
   4-1. Korean voting data   11
   4-2. Sample and variable definition   12
   4-3. Methodology   13
5. Empirical results   17
   5-1. Summary statistics   17
   5-2. Voting behavior of long-tenured directors   18
   5-3. Voting behavior between different terms   21
6. Conclusion   22