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| 001 | 000046116241 | |
| 005 | 20230714173236 | |
| 007 | ta | |
| 008 | 211221s2022 ulkd bmAC 000 eng | |
| 040 | ▼a 211009 ▼c 211009 ▼d 211009 | |
| 041 | 0 | ▼a eng ▼b kor |
| 085 | 0 | ▼a 0510 ▼2 KDCP |
| 090 | ▼a 0510 ▼b 6YB2 ▼c 596 | |
| 100 | 1 | ▼a 라진혁, ▼g 羅鎭赫 |
| 245 | 1 0 | ▼a Essays on corporate governance in Korea / ▼d Ra, Jinhyeok |
| 260 | ▼a Seoul : ▼b Graduate School, Korea University, ▼c 2022 | |
| 300 | ▼a vi, 122장 : ▼b 도표 ; ▼c 26 cm | |
| 500 | ▼a 지도교수: 김우찬 | |
| 500 | ▼a 부록수록 | |
| 502 | 1 | ▼a 학위논문(박사)-- ▼b 고려대학교 대학원, ▼c 경영학과, ▼d 2022. 2 |
| 504 | ▼a 참고문헌: 장 43-46, 101-102 | |
| 530 | ▼a PDF 파일로도 이용가능; ▼c Requires PDF file reader(application/pdf) | |
| 653 | ▼a Executive Compensation ▼a Mandatory Pay Disclosure ▼a Disclosure Avoidance ▼a Shareholder Meeting ▼a Pre-meeting Disclosure ▼a National Pension Service ▼a Corporate Governance | |
| 776 | 0 | ▼t Essays on Corporate Governance in Korea ▼w (DCOLL211009)000000256659 |
| 900 | 1 0 | ▼a Ra, Jinhyeok, ▼e 저 |
| 900 | 1 0 | ▼a 김우찬, ▼g 金佑燦, ▼d 1967-, ▼e 지도교수 ▼0 AUTH(211009)112382 |
| 900 | 1 0 | ▼a Kim, Woochan, ▼e 지도교수 |
| 945 | ▼a ITMT |
Electronic Information
| No. | Title | Service |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Essays on corporate governance in Korea (62회 열람) |
View PDF Abstract Table of Contents |
Holdings Information
| No. | Location | Call Number | Accession No. | Availability | Due Date | Make a Reservation | Service |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| No. 1 | Location Centennial Digital Library/Thesis/ | Call Number 0510 6YB2 596 | Accession No. 163082096 | Availability Available | Due Date | Make a Reservation | Service |
| No. 2 | Location Centennial Digital Library/Thesis/ | Call Number 0510 6YB2 596 | Accession No. 163082097 | Availability Available | Due Date | Make a Reservation | Service |
Contents information
Abstract
This dissertation consists of two essays concerning the corporate governance in Korea. Chapter 1 documents the danger of limiting the coverage of mandatory pay disclosure. Exploiting the restrictive coverage of a regulatory change in Korea in 2013 that became applicable to board members with total annual pay exceeding KRW 500 million, a large proportion of family executives chose to avoid such disclosure through director deregistration, that is, by stepping down from the board. We find that such avoidance is mostly practiced by family executives in firms with high executive-to-worker pay ratios. If the initial pay level is close to the threshold, family executives tend to prefer pay cut over director deregistration as a means of avoidance. Chapter 2 investigates whether pre-meeting vote disclosure by large asset owners can amplify the influence of their votes at shareholders' meeting. We make use of the newly adopted 2019 rule that mandates Korea’s National Pension Service (NPS) to disclose voting decisions before the shareholders’ meeting. Firms subject this pre-meeting disclosure must meet one of the two conditions: the NPS holds at least 10% of the firm’s voting shares, or the firm’s weight in the NPS domestic equity portfolio is at least 1%. Employing regression discontinuity design and difference-in-differences analyses, we find that the NPS pre-meeting disclosure causes other institutional investors to increase their conformity to NPS votes. We further find that this effect mainly originates from the resolutions NPS votes against management; this result is pronounced among the institutional investors who are more likely to face problems related to conflicts of interest.
Table of Contents
Chapter 1. Perils of Limiting the Coverage of Mandatory Pay Disclosure: The Korean Experience 1 1. Introduction 2 2. Executive Compensation Disclosure Policy in Korea 8 3. Hypothesis Development 11 3.1. The benefit of non-disclosure 11 3.2. The cost of director deregistration 13 3.3. The cost of pay cut 14 3.4. Hypotheses 14 4. Data 18 4.1. Definition of variables 18 4.2. Descriptive statistics 24 5. Results 26 5.1. The frequency of disclosure avoidance 26 5.2. Family versus non-family executives 28 5.3. Family versus non-family executives before the rule change 31 5.4. Family and non-family executives not subject to the rule 35 5.5. Executive-to-worker pay ratio and director deregistration 36 5.6. Pay cut versus director deregistration 38 5.7. The 2016 disclosure rule 40 6. Conclusions 41 References 43 Chapter 2. Anchoring Effect of Pre-Meeting Vote Disclosures: Evidence from the National Pension Service 64 1. Introduction 66 2. Hypothesis Development 71 3. Methodology 76 3.1. Sample Construction and Data Sources 76 3.2. Definition of Variables 77 3.3. Research Design 81 4. Results 84 4.1. Summary Statistics 84 4.2. Effect of NPS Pre-meeting Disclosure Using RDD 85 4.2.1. Density of Forcing Variables 85 4.2.2. Sharp RDD Results 87 4.2.3. Fuzzy RDD Results 88 4.3. Effect of Pre-Meeting Disclosure Using DiD 90 4.3.1. DiD Analyses Using Conformity Index 90 4.3.2. DiD Analyses Using Conformity 92 4.4. Conformity to NPS Dissenting Votes 93 4.5. Conflict of Interests versus Information Deficiency 96 4.5.1. Conflict of Interests 96 4.5.2. Information Deficiency 97 5. Conclusion 99 References 101 Appendix 119 Abstract in Korean (국문초록) 121
