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Tax reform in rural China : revenue, resistance, and authoritarian rule

Tax reform in rural China : revenue, resistance, and authoritarian rule

Material type
단행본
Personal Author
Takeuchi, Hiroki.
Title Statement
Tax reform in rural China : revenue, resistance, and authoritarian rule / Hiroki Takeuchi.
Publication, Distribution, etc
New York, NY :   Cambridge University Press,   2014.  
Physical Medium
xix, 234 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
ISBN
9781107056848 (hardback) 1107056845 (hardback) 9781107699991 (paperback) 1107699991 (paperback)
요약
"How does China maintain authoritarian rule while it is committed to market-oriented economic reforms? This book analyzes this puzzle by offering a systematic analysis of the central-local governmental relationship in rural China, focusing on rural taxation and political participation. Drawing on in-depth interviews with Chinese local officials and villagers, and combining them with game-theoretic analyses, it argues that the central government uses local governments as a target of blame for the problems that the central government has actually created. The most recent rural tax reforms, which began in 2000, were a conscious trade-off between fiscal crises and rural instability. For the central government, local fiscal crises and the lack of public goods in agricultural areas were less serious concerns than the heavy financial burdens imposed on farmers and the rural unrest that the predatory extractive behavior of local governments had generated in the 1990s, which threatened both economic reforms and authoritarian rule"--
Content Notes
Machine generated contents note: Introduction; 1. The theory of revenue and resistance under authoritarian rule in rural China; Part I. Historical and Analytical Contexts: 2. Revenue and resistance in rural China in history; 3. Revenue and resistance under authoritarian rule in post-Mao rural China, 1980-2005; 4. Survival strategies of local governments: from predatory taxation to land trade; Part II. Analytic Narratives: 5. Exit strategies of villagers: migration and taxation in rural China; Appendix 5A: formal description and solution to the game of migration and taxation; 6. Voice strategies of villagers: petitions and taxation in rural China; Appendix 6A: formal description and solution to the game of migration, participation, and taxation; 7. Village elections and authoritarian rule in rural China; Appendix 7A: formal description and solution to the village election game; Conclusion; Appendix of empirical sources and methods: Appendix A: list of informants; Appendix B: interview questions; Appendix C: sources of the cases on village elections.
Bibliography, Etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Subject Added Entry-Topical Term
Fiscal policy --China. Taxation --China. Rural population --China. Rural development --China. POLITICAL SCIENCE / Government / International.
000 00000cam u2200205 a 4500
001 000046108923
005 20220304111711
008 220302s2014 nyua b 001 0 eng
010 ▼a 2014009754
020 ▼a 9781107056848 (hardback)
020 ▼a 1107056845 (hardback)
020 ▼a 9781107699991 (paperback)
020 ▼a 1107699991 (paperback)
035 ▼a (KERIS)REF000017460312
040 ▼a DLC ▼b eng ▼c DLC ▼e rda ▼d DLC ▼d 211009
042 ▼a pcc
043 ▼a a-cc---
050 0 0 ▼a HJ1401 ▼b .T35 2014
082 0 0 ▼a 336.2/01451 ▼2 23
084 ▼a POL040020 ▼2 bisacsh
084 ▼a 336.201451 ▼2 DDCK
090 ▼a 336.201451 ▼b T136t
100 1 ▼a Takeuchi, Hiroki.
245 1 0 ▼a Tax reform in rural China : ▼b revenue, resistance, and authoritarian rule / ▼c Hiroki Takeuchi.
260 ▼a New York, NY : ▼b Cambridge University Press, ▼c 2014.
264 1 ▼a New York, NY : ▼b Cambridge University Press, ▼c 2014.
300 ▼a xix, 234 p. : ▼b ill. ; ▼c 24 cm.
336 ▼a text ▼2 rdacontent
337 ▼a unmediated ▼2 rdamedia
338 ▼a volume ▼2 rdacarrier
504 ▼a Includes bibliographical references and index.
505 8 ▼a Machine generated contents note: Introduction; 1. The theory of revenue and resistance under authoritarian rule in rural China; Part I. Historical and Analytical Contexts: 2. Revenue and resistance in rural China in history; 3. Revenue and resistance under authoritarian rule in post-Mao rural China, 1980-2005; 4. Survival strategies of local governments: from predatory taxation to land trade; Part II. Analytic Narratives: 5. Exit strategies of villagers: migration and taxation in rural China; Appendix 5A: formal description and solution to the game of migration and taxation; 6. Voice strategies of villagers: petitions and taxation in rural China; Appendix 6A: formal description and solution to the game of migration, participation, and taxation; 7. Village elections and authoritarian rule in rural China; Appendix 7A: formal description and solution to the village election game; Conclusion; Appendix of empirical sources and methods: Appendix A: list of informants; Appendix B: interview questions; Appendix C: sources of the cases on village elections.
520 ▼a "How does China maintain authoritarian rule while it is committed to market-oriented economic reforms? This book analyzes this puzzle by offering a systematic analysis of the central-local governmental relationship in rural China, focusing on rural taxation and political participation. Drawing on in-depth interviews with Chinese local officials and villagers, and combining them with game-theoretic analyses, it argues that the central government uses local governments as a target of blame for the problems that the central government has actually created. The most recent rural tax reforms, which began in 2000, were a conscious trade-off between fiscal crises and rural instability. For the central government, local fiscal crises and the lack of public goods in agricultural areas were less serious concerns than the heavy financial burdens imposed on farmers and the rural unrest that the predatory extractive behavior of local governments had generated in the 1990s, which threatened both economic reforms and authoritarian rule"-- ▼c Provided by publisher.
650 0 ▼a Fiscal policy ▼z China.
650 0 ▼a Taxation ▼z China.
650 0 ▼a Rural population ▼z China.
650 0 ▼a Rural development ▼z China.
650 7 ▼a POLITICAL SCIENCE / Government / International. ▼2 bisacsh.
945 ▼a ITMT

Holdings Information

No. Location Call Number Accession No. Availability Due Date Make a Reservation Service
No. 1 Location Main Library/Western Books/ Call Number 336.201451 T136t Accession No. 111859803 Availability Available Due Date Make a Reservation Service B M

Contents information

Table of Contents

Introduction; 1. The theory of revenue and resistance under authoritarian rule in rural China; Part I. Historical and Analytical Contexts: 2. Revenue and resistance in rural China in history; 3. Revenue and resistance under authoritarian rule in post-Mao rural China, 1980-2005; 4. Survival strategies of local governments: from predatory taxation to land trade; Part II. Analytic Narratives: 5. Exit strategies of villagers: migration and taxation in rural China; Appendix 5A: formal description and solution to the game of migration and taxation; 6. Voice strategies of villagers: petitions and taxation in rural China; Appendix 6A: formal description and solution to the game of migration, participation, and taxation; 7. Village elections and authoritarian rule in rural China; Appendix 7A: formal description and solution to the village election game; Conclusion; Appendix of empirical sources and methods: Appendix A: list of informants; Appendix B: interview questions; Appendix C: sources of the cases on village elections.

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