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Conditionality and coercion : electoral clientelism in Eastern Europe

Conditionality and coercion : electoral clientelism in Eastern Europe (1회 대출)

자료유형
단행본
개인저자
Mares, Isabela. Young, Lauren E.
서명 / 저자사항
Conditionality and coercion : electoral clientelism in Eastern Europe / Isabela Mares and Lauren E. Young.
발행사항
Oxford, UK :   Oxford University Press,   2019.  
형태사항
xii, 321 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
총서사항
Oxford studies in democratization
ISBN
9780198832775 (hbk.) 019883277X (hbk.) 9780198832782 (pbk.) 0198832788 (pbk.)
요약
In many recent democracies, candidates compete for office using illegal strategies to influence voters. In Hungary and Romania, local actors including mayors and bureaucrats offer access to social policy benefits to voters who offer to support their preferred candidates, and they threaten others with the loss of a range of policy and private benefits for voting the "wrong" way. These quid pro quo exchanges are often called clientelism. How can politicians and their accomplices get away with such illegal campaigning in otherwise democratic, competitive elections? When do they rely on the worst forms of clientelism that involve threatening voters and manipulating public benefits? 'Conditionality and Coercion: Electoral Clientelism in Eastern Europe' uses a mixed method approach to understand how illegal forms of campaigning, including vote buying and electoral coercion, persist in two democratic countries in the European Union. It argues that we must disaggregate clientelistic strategies based on whether they use public or private resources, and whether they involve positive promises or negative threats and coercion. We document that the type of clientelistic strategies that candidates and brokers use varies systematically across localities based on their underlying social coalitions. We also show that voters assess and sanction different forms of clientelism in different ways. Voters glean information about politicians' personal characteristics and their policy preferences from the clientelistic strategies these candidates deploy.
서지주기
Includes bibliographical references (p. [297]-306) and index.
일반주제명
Elections --Corrupt practices --Europe, Eastern.
주제명(지명)
Hungary --Politics and government --1989-.
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100 1 ▼a Mares, Isabela.
245 1 0 ▼a Conditionality and coercion : ▼b electoral clientelism in Eastern Europe / ▼c Isabela Mares and Lauren E. Young.
260 ▼a Oxford, UK : ▼b Oxford University Press, ▼c 2019.
300 ▼a xii, 321 p. : ▼b ill. ; ▼c 24 cm.
490 1 ▼a Oxford studies in democratization
504 ▼a Includes bibliographical references (p. [297]-306) and index.
520 8 ▼a In many recent democracies, candidates compete for office using illegal strategies to influence voters. In Hungary and Romania, local actors including mayors and bureaucrats offer access to social policy benefits to voters who offer to support their preferred candidates, and they threaten others with the loss of a range of policy and private benefits for voting the "wrong" way. These quid pro quo exchanges are often called clientelism. How can politicians and their accomplices get away with such illegal campaigning in otherwise democratic, competitive elections? When do they rely on the worst forms of clientelism that involve threatening voters and manipulating public benefits? 'Conditionality and Coercion: Electoral Clientelism in Eastern Europe' uses a mixed method approach to understand how illegal forms of campaigning, including vote buying and electoral coercion, persist in two democratic countries in the European Union. It argues that we must disaggregate clientelistic strategies based on whether they use public or private resources, and whether they involve positive promises or negative threats and coercion. We document that the type of clientelistic strategies that candidates and brokers use varies systematically across localities based on their underlying social coalitions. We also show that voters assess and sanction different forms of clientelism in different ways. Voters glean information about politicians' personal characteristics and their policy preferences from the clientelistic strategies these candidates deploy.
650 0 ▼a Elections ▼x Corrupt practices ▼z Europe, Eastern.
651 0 ▼a Hungary ▼x Politics and government ▼y 1989-.
651 0 ▼a Romania ▼x Politics and government ▼y 1989-.
700 1 ▼a Young, Lauren E.
830 0 ▼a Oxford studies in democratization.
945 ▼a KLPA

소장정보

No. 소장처 청구기호 등록번호 도서상태 반납예정일 예약 서비스
No. 1 소장처 중앙도서관/서고6층/ 청구기호 324.6609439 M325c 등록번호 111824721 도서상태 대출가능 반납예정일 예약 서비스 B M

컨텐츠정보

목차

Acknowledgments
List of Abbreviations
List of Figures
1: Introduction
2: Disaggregating clientelism: resource constraints and information signals
3: Context and research design
4: Policy favors
5: Policy coercion: social conflict and control
6: Economic coercion: conflict and forbearance
7: Vote buying: Nontargeted and unmonitored
8: Conclusion
Appendices
Appendix A: Qualitative Interviews
Appendix B. Locality Surveys
Appendix C Survey Experiments
Notes
References
Index

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