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Game theory, diplomatic history and security studies

Game theory, diplomatic history and security studies (1회 대출)

자료유형
단행본
개인저자
Zagare, Frank C.
서명 / 저자사항
Game theory, diplomatic history and security studies / Frank C. Zagare.
발행사항
Oxford, United Kingdom ;   New York :   Oxford University Press,   2019.  
형태사항
xiv, 185 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
ISBN
9780198831587 (hardback) 0198831587 (hardback) 9780198831594 (paperback) 0198831595 (paperback)
서지주기
Includes bibliographical references (p. [167]-179) and index.
일반주제명
International relations --Mathematical models. International relations --History --20th century. Game theory.
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010 ▼a 2018956452
020 ▼a 9780198831587 (hardback)
020 ▼a 0198831587 (hardback)
020 ▼a 9780198831594 (paperback)
020 ▼a 0198831595 (paperback)
035 ▼a (KERIS)REF000018993981
040 ▼a DLC ▼b eng ▼c DLC ▼e rda ▼d DLC ▼d 211009
050 0 0 ▼a JZ1242 ▼b .Z34 2019
082 0 4 ▼a 327.10151932 ▼2 23
084 ▼a 327.10151932 ▼2 DDCK
090 ▼a 327.10151932 ▼b Z18g
100 1 ▼a Zagare, Frank C.
245 1 0 ▼a Game theory, diplomatic history and security studies / ▼c Frank C. Zagare.
260 ▼a Oxford, United Kingdom ; ▼a New York : ▼b Oxford University Press, ▼c 2019.
300 ▼a xiv, 185 p. : ▼b ill. ; ▼c 24 cm.
504 ▼a Includes bibliographical references (p. [167]-179) and index.
650 0 ▼a International relations ▼x Mathematical models.
650 0 ▼a International relations ▼x History ▼y 20th century.
650 0 ▼a Game theory.
945 ▼a KLPA

소장정보

No. 소장처 청구기호 등록번호 도서상태 반납예정일 예약 서비스
No. 1 소장처 중앙도서관/서고6층/ 청구기호 327.10151932 Z18g 등록번호 111811785 도서상태 대출가능 반납예정일 예약 서비스 B M

컨텐츠정보

목차

Section	Section Description	Page Number
List of Figures	p. xiii
List of Tables	p. xv
Introduction	p. 1
Part I	Overview	
1	    Game Theory and Security Studies	p. 7
1.1	        Introduction	p. 7
1.2	        Primitive Concepts	p. 7
1.3	        Strategic Form Games and Nash Equilibria	p. 9
1.4	        Extensive Form Games, Backward Induction, and Subgame Perfect Equilibria	p. 13
1.5	        Applications of Game Theory in Security Studies	p. 16
1.6	        Strategic Form Games with Incomplete Information: Bayesian (Nash) Equilibria	p. 19
1.7	        Coda	p. 24
2	    Game Theory and Diplomatic History	p. 25
2.1	        Introduction	p. 25
2.2	        Game Models and Historical Narratives: An Easy Case	p. 26
2.3	        Some Factors that May Complicate Explanation in Less than Easy Cases	p. 30
2.4	        Why Use Game-Theoretic Models to Construct an Analytic Narrative?	p. 35
2.5	        Coda	p. 36
Part II	Diplomatic History	
3	    The Moroccan Crisis of 1905-6	p. 41
3.1	        Introduction	p. 41
3.2	        Background	p. 41
3.3	        Modeling the Crisis	p. 42
3.4	        Preference and Information Assumptions	p. 44
3.5	        Behavioral Patterns	p. 49
3.6	        The Crisis	p. 52
3.6.1	            Diplomatic Foreplay: From the Visit to Tangier to the Fall of Delcassé	p. 54
3.6.2	            Endgame: The Conference at Algeciras	p. 56
3.7	        Coda	p. 58
4	    A Game-Theoretic History of the Cuban Missile Crisis	p. 61
4.1	        Introduction	p. 61
4.2	        Some Preliminaries	p. 61
4.3	        Thomas Schelling and the "Threat That Leaves Something to Chance"	p. 62
4.4	        Nigel Howard and the Theory of Metagames	p. 67
4.5	        Fraser, Hipel, and the Analysis of Options Technique	p. 71
4.6	        Steven J. Brams and the Theory of Moves	p. 75
4.7	        R. Harrison Wagner and Games with Incomplete Information	p. 78
4.8	        Coda	p. 80
5	    A General Explanation of the Cuban Missile Crisis	p. 83
5.1	        Introduction	p. 83
5.2	        The Asymmetric Escalation Game	p. 84
5.3	        Preferences and Type Designations	p. 86
5.4	        Equilibria	p. 88
5.5	        Explanation	p. 93
5.6	        The United States and North Korea: A Cuban Missile Crisis in Slow Motion?	p. 95
5.7	        Coda	p. 97
6	    Explaining the 1914 War in Europe	p. 99
6.1	        Introduction	p. 99
6.2	        Background	p. 100
6.3	        Asymmetric Escalation Game Redux	p. 101
6.4	        Preferences	p. 106
6.5	        Some Caveats	p. 107
6.6	        Special Case Analysis and Discussion	p. 110
6.6.1	            What Were They Thinking?	p. 110
6.6.2	            Was War Avoidable?	p. 112
6.6.3	            Why Did It Happen?	p. 114
6.7	        Coda	p. 123
Part III	Security Studies	
7	    Perfect Deterrence Theory	p. 127
7.1	        Introduction	p. 127
7.2	        Classical Deterrence Theory	p. 127
7.3	        Perfect Deterrence Theory	p. 130
7.3.1	            Strategic Variables	p. 131
7.3.2	            Relationship Predictions	p. 135
7.3.3	            Empirical Support	p. 137
7.3.4	            Policy Implications	p. 139
7.3.5	            Some Specifics	p. 142
7.4	        Coda	p. 144
8	    Explaining the Long Peace	p. 145
8.1	        Introduction	p. 145
8.2	        John von Neumann and Prisoners'' Dilemma	p. 148
8.3	        Rational Deterrence	p. 151
8.4	        Thomas Schelling and Chicken	p. 155
8.5	        Coda	p. 159
Postscript	p. 161
Glossary of Basic Concepts	p. 165
Bibliography	p. 167
Index	p. 181

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