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Document transformation algorithm for detoxifying malicious documents

Document transformation algorithm for detoxifying malicious documents

자료유형
학위논문
개인저자
한지연 韓智淵
서명 / 저자사항
Document transformation algorithm for detoxifying malicious documents / Jiyeon Han
발행사항
Seoul :   Graduate School, Korea Unversity,   2019  
형태사항
viii, 35장 : 도표 ; 26 cm
기타형태 저록
Document transformation algorithm for detoxifying malicious documents   (DCOLL211009)000000083455  
학위논문주기
학위논문(석사)-- 고려대학교 대학원: 컴퓨터·전파통신공학과, 2019. 2
학과코드
0510   6D36   1092  
일반주기
지도교수: 이희조  
서지주기
참고문헌: 장 32-35
이용가능한 다른형태자료
PDF 파일로도 이용가능;   Requires PDF file reader(application/pdf)  
비통제주제어
Malicious document , Shellcode,,
000 00000nam c2200205 c 4500
001 000045978609
005 20190416154238
007 ta
008 190101s2019 ulkd bmAC 000c eng
040 ▼a 211009 ▼c 211009 ▼d 211009
085 0 ▼a 0510 ▼2 KDCP
090 ▼a 0510 ▼b 6D36 ▼c 1092
100 1 ▼a 한지연 ▼g 韓智淵
245 1 0 ▼a Document transformation algorithm for detoxifying malicious documents / ▼d Jiyeon Han
260 ▼a Seoul : ▼b Graduate School, Korea Unversity, ▼c 2019
300 ▼a viii, 35장 : ▼b 도표 ; ▼c 26 cm
500 ▼a 지도교수: 이희조
502 0 ▼a 학위논문(석사)-- ▼b 고려대학교 대학원: ▼c 컴퓨터·전파통신공학과, ▼d 2019. 2
504 ▼a 참고문헌: 장 32-35
530 ▼a PDF 파일로도 이용가능; ▼c Requires PDF file reader(application/pdf)
653 ▼a Malicious document ▼a Shellcode
776 0 ▼t Document transformation algorithm for detoxifying malicious documents ▼w (DCOLL211009)000000083455
900 1 0 ▼a Han, Ji-yeon, ▼e
900 1 0 ▼a 이희조 ▼g 李喜造, ▼e 지도교수
900 1 0 ▼a Lee, Hee-jo, ▼e 지도교수
945 ▼a KLPA

전자정보

No. 원문명 서비스
1
Document transformation algorithm for detoxifying malicious documents (46회 열람)
PDF 초록 목차

소장정보

No. 소장처 청구기호 등록번호 도서상태 반납예정일 예약 서비스
No. 1 소장처 과학도서관/학위논문서고/ 청구기호 0510 6D36 1092 등록번호 123060843 도서상태 대출가능 반납예정일 예약 서비스 B M
No. 2 소장처 과학도서관/학위논문서고/ 청구기호 0510 6D36 1092 등록번호 123060844 도서상태 대출가능 반납예정일 예약 서비스 B M

컨텐츠정보

초록

Malicious documents are commonly attached to phishing emails or downloaded during web browsing. The malicious documents primarily contain an exploit code that triggers vulnerability when the user opens the document. The exploit code includes a shellcode that performs malicious behaviors. Many studies have been conducted for detecting malicious documents such as static analysis, dynamic analysis, and machine learning. Nonetheless, because attackers continue to create new types of shellcodes to bypass the existing detection methods, detecting malicious documents is like an endless race with the attackers. On the other hand, for the purpose of prevention, content randomization is available to split the shellcodes by randomizing the structure of documents. However, if the shellcodes are less than 512 bytes, there is a possibility that the shellcodes can be located within a sector without being split, which is an unintended case of content randomization.

In this thesis, we propose DeDocs, which is a Moving Target Defense (MTD) approach through“content transformation”for preventing exploits in documents. Content transformation method consists of document resize, dummy code insertion, and content reordering.

DeDocs not only blocks the exploits that are less than 512 bytes but also does not cause harm if applied to normal documents because the content of the dummy code is filled with the element of the document which is legitimate but uninfluential. Thus, the dummy code can be performed as a normal element of the document and it also defends the executing exploits. We collected a total of 7,786 malicious documents in the forms of .doc, .xls, .ppt from Contagio, Virustotal, and Virussign from years 2014 to 2017. Among the 7,786 samples, 135 samples were used in the test, which samples not only includes a shellcode but also successfully reproduced exploits. On the tests, DeDocs showed a reasonable size overhead of less than 2% and resulted in 88.9% prevention of 120 from 135 malicious documents. The prevention rate of DeDocs is 34.1% higher, compared with 54.8% prevention of content randomization.

DeDocs presents a more radical and innovative solution strategy for malicious document detection. It prevents exploit execution of malicious documents through content transformation without detecting the documents, and thus, even if a new type of shellcode appears, no additional defense techniques are required. In addition, by using a small unit of a document file, DeDocs prevents the execution of a small exploit code. In this study, we describe principles of DeDocs, evaluate its defense effectiveness, and analyze the results.

목차

Abstract	i
Contents	iii
List of Figures	v
List of Tables	vii
List of Equations	viii
1.	Introduction	1
1.1.	Motivation	1
1.2.	Approach	3
1.3.	Contributions	3
1.4.	Thesis Outline	4
2.	Background and Related Work	5
2.1.	Background	5
2.1.1.	Document structure	5
2.1.2.	Malicious document	6
2.2.	Related Work	6
2.2.1.	Detection of malicious shellcode	7
2.2.2.	Protection of malicious shellcode	7
2.2.3.	OS protection	8
3.	The Proposed Method: DeDocs	10
3.1.	Small-sized shellcode	10
3.2.	Design of DeDocs	12
3.3.	Document resize	13
3.4.	Dummy code insertion	14
3.4.1.	Location searching	14
3.4.2.	Size calculation	16
3.4.3.	Dummy creation	17
3.5.	Content reordering	19
3.5.1.	Reordering condition 1	19
3.5.2.	Reordering condition 2	19
4.	Evaluation	21
4.1.	Data collection and implementation	21
4.2.	Prevention rate of DeDocs	22
4.3.	File size overhead	24
4.4.	Compare with other tools	26
5.	Discussion	28
6.	Conclusion	31
Reference	32

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