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Innovation in public sector services : entrepreneurship, creativity and management

Innovation in public sector services : entrepreneurship, creativity and management (2회 대출)

자료유형
단행본
개인저자
Windrum, Paul, 1966-. Koch, Per M.
서명 / 저자사항
Innovation in public sector services : entrepreneurship, creativity and management / edited by Paul Windrum, Per Koch.
발행사항
Cheltenham, UK ;   Northampton, MA :   Edward Elgar,   c2008.  
형태사항
xi, 251 p. : ill. ; 25 cm.
ISBN
9781845426316 (hbk.) 1845426312 (hbk.)
서지주기
Includes bibliographical references and index.
일반주제명
Public administration. Organizational change. Technological innovations.
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015 ▼a GBA820665 ▼2 bnb
020 ▼a 9781845426316 (hbk.)
020 ▼a 1845426312 (hbk.)
035 ▼a (KERIS)REF000015096266
040 ▼a UKM ▼c UKM ▼d BTCTA ▼d BAKER ▼d YDXCP ▼d BWKUK ▼d BWK ▼d BWX ▼d CDX ▼d 211009
050 4 ▼a JF1525.O73 ▼b I55 2008
082 0 4 ▼a 352.367 ▼2 23
084 ▼a 352.367 ▼2 DDCK
090 ▼a 352.367 ▼b I58
245 0 0 ▼a Innovation in public sector services : ▼b entrepreneurship, creativity and management / ▼c edited by Paul Windrum, Per Koch.
260 ▼a Cheltenham, UK ; ▼a Northampton, MA : ▼b Edward Elgar, ▼c c2008.
300 ▼a xi, 251 p. : ▼b ill. ; ▼c 25 cm.
504 ▼a Includes bibliographical references and index.
650 0 ▼a Public administration.
650 0 ▼a Organizational change.
650 0 ▼a Technological innovations.
700 1 ▼a Windrum, Paul, ▼d 1966-.
700 1 ▼a Koch, Per M.
945 ▼a KLPA

소장정보

No. 소장처 청구기호 등록번호 도서상태 반납예정일 예약 서비스
No. 1 소장처 중앙도서관/서고6층/ 청구기호 352.367 I58 등록번호 111804158 도서상태 대출가능 반납예정일 예약 서비스 B M

컨텐츠정보

목차

Front Cover -- The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance -- Copyright -- Contents -- Contributors -- Acknowledgments -- 1 Introduction: The Study of Corporate Governance -- 1 Theoretical Underpinnings -- 2 Legal and Market-Wide Factors -- 3 Governance Components -- 4 External Constituents -- 5 International and Intertemporal Issues -- 6 Some Additional Thoughts -- References -- 2 Aspects of the Economics of Organization with Application to Corporate Governance -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Agency Models -- 2.1 The basics of hidden-information agency -- 2.1.1 Mechanisms -- 2.1.2 The revelation principle -- 2.1.3 Participation -- 2.1.4 The taxation principle -- 2.1.5 The standard framework -- 2.1.6 Characterization of direct-revelation mechanisms -- 2.1.7 The optimal mechanism for the principal -- 2.1.8 Information rent and distortions from ef ciency -- 2.1.9 Menus: when actions and veri able signals are distinct -- 2.2 The basics of hidden-action agency -- 2.2.1 The standard model -- 2.2.2 The rst best -- 2.2.3 Implementability -- 2.2.4 The solution: part I -- 2.2.5 More on information -- 2.2.6 The solution: part II (limited liability) -- 2.2.7 The threat of dismissal as an incentive -- 2.3 Extensions of the basic agency models -- 2.3.1 Renegotiation of agency contracts -- 2.3.2 Dynamic agency -- 2.3.3 Agency contracts in a broader environment -- 2.4 Agency: conclusions -- 3 Reputation and Repeated Interaction -- 3.1 Corporate culture and leadership -- 3.2 Relational contracting: why? -- 3.3 Relational contracting: an incentives example -- 3.3.1 Ef ciency wages -- 3.3.2 Informal contracts tying compensation to action -- 4 Next Steps -- A More on Solving Mechanism-Design Problems -- A.1 Bunching-when pointwise optimization is invalid -- B Proofs Not Given in Text -- References -- 3 Assessing Managerial Ability: Implications for Corporate Governance -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Basics of Learning -- 2.1 The issue -- 2.2 An application: a model of CEO dismissal/retention -- 2.3 Empirical analyses of management turnover and learning -- 3 Career Concerns -- 3.1 Career concerns: theory -- 3.2 Career concerns: empirics -- 3.2.1 Evidence from intertemporal pattern of incentives -- 3.2.2 Estimating learning about CEOs of public corporations -- 3.2.3 Evidence from the money management industry -- 4 Signal Jamming: Project Choice and Managerial Myopia -- 4.1 Project choice -- 4.1.1 When no project may be available -- 4.2 Managerial myopia -- 4.3 Empirical analyses of myopia -- 5 Learning About Governance and Capital Markets -- 5.1 Learning models and capital markets -- 5.2 How learning about management affects capital markets -- 5.3 Capital market inferences about other executives and other dimensions of governance -- 6 Further Implications for Governance -- 6.1 Bargaining over oversight -- 6.2 Consequences for choice of manager -- 6.3 Consequences for choice of information structures -- 7 How Non-Bayesian Updating Affects Governance -- 7.1 How do people.

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