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Unelected power : the quest for legitimacy in central banking and the regulatory state

Unelected power : the quest for legitimacy in central banking and the regulatory state (3회 대출)

자료유형
단행본
개인저자
Tucker, Paul M. W., 1958-.
서명 / 저자사항
Unelected power : the quest for legitimacy in central banking and the regulatory state / Paul Tucker.
발행사항
Princeton, New Jersey :   Princeton University Press,   c2018.  
형태사항
xii, 642 p. ; 25 cm.
기타형태 저록
Online version:   Tucker, Paul   Unelected Power : The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State   Princeton : Princeton University Press,c2018   9781400889518   (211009) 000045980937  
ISBN
9780691176734 (hardback : alk. paper) 0691176736 (hardback : alk. paper)
요약
Central bankers have emerged from the financial crisis as the third great pillar of unelected power alongside the judiciary and the military. They pull the regulatory and financial levers of our economic well-being, yet unlike democratically elected leaders, their power does not come directly from the people. Unelected Power lays out the principles needed to ensure that central bankers, technocrats, regulators, and other agents of the administrative state remain stewards of the common good and do not become overmighty citizens. Paul Tucker draws on a wealth of personal experience from his many years in domestic and international policymaking to tackle the big issues raised by unelected power, and enriches his discussion with examples from the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and the European Union. Blending economics, political theory, and public law, Tucker explores the necessary conditions for delegated but politically insulated power to be legitimate in the eyes of constitutional democracy and the rule of law. He explains why the solution must fit with how real-world government is structured, and why technocrats and their political overseers need incentives to make the system work as intended. Tucker explains how the regulatory state need not be a fourth branch of government free to steer by its own lights, and how central bankers can emulate the best of judicial self-restraint and become models of dispersed power.--
일반주기
Online version: Tucker, Paul Unelected Power : The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State Princeton : Princeton University Press,c2018 9781400889518
서지주기
Includes bibliographical references and index.
일반주제명
Banks and banking --State supervision. Banking law. Financial institutions --Government policy. Monetary policy.
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100 1 ▼a Tucker, Paul M. W., ▼d 1958-.
245 1 0 ▼a Unelected power : ▼b the quest for legitimacy in central banking and the regulatory state / ▼c Paul Tucker.
246 3 0 ▼a Quest for legitimacy in central banking and the regulatory state
260 ▼a Princeton, New Jersey : ▼b Princeton University Press, ▼c c2018.
300 ▼a xii, 642 p. ; ▼c 25 cm.
504 ▼a Includes bibliographical references and index.
520 ▼a Central bankers have emerged from the financial crisis as the third great pillar of unelected power alongside the judiciary and the military. They pull the regulatory and financial levers of our economic well-being, yet unlike democratically elected leaders, their power does not come directly from the people. Unelected Power lays out the principles needed to ensure that central bankers, technocrats, regulators, and other agents of the administrative state remain stewards of the common good and do not become overmighty citizens. Paul Tucker draws on a wealth of personal experience from his many years in domestic and international policymaking to tackle the big issues raised by unelected power, and enriches his discussion with examples from the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and the European Union. Blending economics, political theory, and public law, Tucker explores the necessary conditions for delegated but politically insulated power to be legitimate in the eyes of constitutional democracy and the rule of law. He explains why the solution must fit with how real-world government is structured, and why technocrats and their political overseers need incentives to make the system work as intended. Tucker explains how the regulatory state need not be a fourth branch of government free to steer by its own lights, and how central bankers can emulate the best of judicial self-restraint and become models of dispersed power.-- ▼c Provided by Publisher.
650 0 ▼a Banks and banking ▼x State supervision.
650 0 ▼a Banking law.
650 0 ▼a Financial institutions ▼x Government policy.
650 0 ▼a Monetary policy.
776 0 8 ▼i Online version: ▼a Tucker, Paul ▼t Unelected Power : The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State ▼d Princeton : Princeton University Press,c2018 ▼z 9781400889518 ▼w (211009) 000045980937
945 ▼a KLPA

소장정보

No. 소장처 청구기호 등록번호 도서상태 반납예정일 예약 서비스
No. 1 소장처 중앙도서관/서고6층/ 청구기호 332.11 T893u 등록번호 111798348 도서상태 대출중 반납예정일 2022-02-23 예약 예약가능 R 서비스 M

컨텐츠정보

목차

Preface	p. ix
1	Introduction: Power, Welfare, Incentives, Values	p. 1
Part I	Welfare: The Problem, and a Possible Solution	p. 25
2	    The Evolution of the Administrative State	p. 27
3	    The Purposes and Functional Modes of the Administrative State: Market Failure and Government Failure	p. 48
4	    The Structure of the Administrative State: A Hierarchy from Simple Agents to Trustees (and Guardians)	p. 72
5	    Principles for Whether to Delegate to Independent Agencies: Credible Commitment to Settled Goals	p. 92
6	    Design Precepts for How to Delegate to Independent Agencies	p. 109
7	    Applying the Principles for Delegation	p. 127
Part II	Values: Democratic Legitimacy for Independent Agencies	p. 147
8	    Independent Agencies and Our Political Values and Beliefs (1): Rule of Law and Constitutionalism	p. 173
9	    Independent Agencies and Our Political Values and Beliefs (2): The Challenges to Delegation-with-Insulation Presented by Democracy	p. 195
10	    Credible Commitment versus Democracy: Agencies versus Judges	p. 221
11	    The Political-Values-and-Norms Robustness Test of the Principles for Delegation	p. 236
12	    Insulated Agencies and Constitutionalism: Central Bank Independence Driven by the Separation of Powers but Not a Fourth Branch	p. 272
Part III	Incentives: The Administrative State in the Real World; Incentives and Values under Different Constitutional Structures	p. 293
13	    States'' Capacity for Principled Delegation to Deliver Credible Commitment	p. 307
14	    The Problem of Vague Objectives: A Nondelegation Doctrine for IAs	p. 334
15	    Processes, Transparency, and Accountability: Legal Constraints versus Political Oversight	p. 349
16	    The Limits of Design: Power, Emergencies, and Self-Restraint	p. 378
Part IV	Power: Overmighty Citizens? The Political Economy of Central Banking; Power, Legitimacy, and Reconstruction	p. 391
17	    Central Banking and the Politics of Monetary Policy	p. 405
18	    The Shift in Ideas: Credibility as a Surprising Door to Legitimacy	p. 414
19	    Tempting the Gods: Monetary Regime Orthodoxy before the Crisis	p. 426
20	    A Money-Credit Constitution: Central Banks and Banking Stability	p. 438
21	    Central Banking and the Regulatory State: Stability Policy	p. 461
22	    Central Banking and the Fiscal State: Balance-Sheet Policy and the Fiscal Carve-Out	p. 482
23	    Central Banks and the Emergency State: Lessons from Military/Civilian Relations for the Lender of Last Resort	p. 503
24	    Overmighty Citizens After All? Threats and Reconfigurations	p. 525
Conclusion: Unelected Democrats: Citizens in Service, Not in Charge	p. 546
Appendix: The Principles for Delegation to Independent Agencies Insulated from Day-to-Day Politics	p. 569
Acknowledgments	p. 573
Bibliography	p. 579
Index	p. 611

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