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The innocent eye : why vision is not a cognitive process

The innocent eye : why vision is not a cognitive process (Loan 1 times)

Material type
단행본
Personal Author
Orlandi, Nico.
Title Statement
The innocent eye : why vision is not a cognitive process / Nico Orlandi.
Publication, Distribution, etc
Oxford :   Oxford University Press,   2014.  
Physical Medium
xii, 247 p. : ill. ; 25 cm.
기타형태 저록
Online version:   Orlandi, Nico.   The innocent eye : why vision is not a cognitive process   9780199375059   (211009) 000045976204  
ISBN
9780199375035 (hardback)
요약
"Why does the world look to us as it does? Generally speaking, this question has received two types of answers in the cognitive sciences in the past fifty or so years. According to the first, the world looks to us the way it does because we construct it to look as it does. According to the second, the world looks as it does primarily because of how the world is. In The Innocent Eye, Nico Orlandi defends a position that aligns with this second, world-centered tradition, but that also respects some of the insights of constructivism. Orlandi develops an embedded understanding of visual processing according to which, while visual percepts are representational states, the states and structures that precede the production of percepts are not representations. If we study the environmental contingencies in which vision occurs, and we properly distinguish functional states and features of the visual apparatus from representational states and features, we obtain an empirically more plausible, world-centered account. Orlandi shows that this account accords well with models of vision in perceptual psychology -- such as Natural Scene Statistics and Bayesian approaches to perception -- and outlines some of the ways in which it differs from recent 'enactive' approaches to vision. The main difference is that, although the embedded account recognizes the importance of movement for perception, it does not appeal to action to uncover the richness of visual stimulation. The upshot is that constructive models of vision ascribe mental representations too liberally, ultimately misunderstanding the notion. Orlandi offers a proposal for what mental representations are that, following insights from Brentano, James and a number of contemporary cognitive scientists, appeals to the notions of de-coupleability and absence to distinguish representations from mere tracking states"--
General Note
Online version: Orlandi, Nico. The innocent eye : why vision is not a cognitive process 9780199375059
Bibliography, Etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references (p. 223-240) and index.
Subject Added Entry-Topical Term
Vision --Philosophy. Visual perception.
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008 151228s2014 enka b 001 0 eng d
010 ▼a 2013044596
020 ▼a 9780199375035 (hardback)
035 ▼a (KERIS)REF000017396707
040 ▼a DLC ▼b eng ▼c DLC ▼e rda ▼d DLC ▼d 211009
050 0 0 ▼a B105.V54 ▼b O75 2014
082 0 0 ▼a 152.14 ▼2 23
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100 1 ▼a Orlandi, Nico.
245 1 4 ▼a The innocent eye : ▼b why vision is not a cognitive process / ▼c Nico Orlandi.
260 ▼a Oxford : ▼b Oxford University Press, ▼c 2014.
300 ▼a xii, 247 p. : ▼b ill. ; ▼c 25 cm.
504 ▼a Includes bibliographical references (p. 223-240) and index.
520 ▼a "Why does the world look to us as it does? Generally speaking, this question has received two types of answers in the cognitive sciences in the past fifty or so years. According to the first, the world looks to us the way it does because we construct it to look as it does. According to the second, the world looks as it does primarily because of how the world is. In The Innocent Eye, Nico Orlandi defends a position that aligns with this second, world-centered tradition, but that also respects some of the insights of constructivism. Orlandi develops an embedded understanding of visual processing according to which, while visual percepts are representational states, the states and structures that precede the production of percepts are not representations. If we study the environmental contingencies in which vision occurs, and we properly distinguish functional states and features of the visual apparatus from representational states and features, we obtain an empirically more plausible, world-centered account. Orlandi shows that this account accords well with models of vision in perceptual psychology -- such as Natural Scene Statistics and Bayesian approaches to perception -- and outlines some of the ways in which it differs from recent 'enactive' approaches to vision. The main difference is that, although the embedded account recognizes the importance of movement for perception, it does not appeal to action to uncover the richness of visual stimulation. The upshot is that constructive models of vision ascribe mental representations too liberally, ultimately misunderstanding the notion. Orlandi offers a proposal for what mental representations are that, following insights from Brentano, James and a number of contemporary cognitive scientists, appeals to the notions of de-coupleability and absence to distinguish representations from mere tracking states"-- ▼c Provided by publisher.
650 0 ▼a Vision ▼x Philosophy.
650 0 ▼a Visual perception.
776 0 8 ▼i Online version: ▼a Orlandi, Nico. ▼t The innocent eye : why vision is not a cognitive process ▼z 9780199375059 ▼w (211009) 000045976204
945 ▼a KLPA

Holdings Information

No. Location Call Number Accession No. Availability Due Date Make a Reservation Service
No. 1 Location Main Library/Western Books/ Call Number 152.14 O71i Accession No. 111747938 Availability Available Due Date Make a Reservation Service B M

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