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Lawyer barons : what their contingency fees really cost America

Lawyer barons : what their contingency fees really cost America

자료유형
단행본
개인저자
Brickman, Lester, 1940-.
서명 / 저자사항
Lawyer barons : what their contingency fees really cost America / Lester Brickman.
발행사항
New York :   Cambridge University Press,   2011.  
형태사항
xxv, 556 p. ; 24 cm.
ISBN
9781107001220 (hardback : alk. paper) 1107001226 (hardback : alk. paper) 9780521189491 (pbk. : alk. paper) 0521189497 (pbk. : alk. paper)
내용주기
The origin of the contingency fee -- How profitable are contingency fees? -- Are contingency fee profits "reasonable"? -- How tort lawyers have increased their profits by restraining competition -- Why the market has failed to correct the absence of price competition -- Impediments imposed by the bar to price competition -- The effects of incentives created by contingency fees -- How the quest for profits influenced the development of the tort system -- Lawyers' role in the expansion of tort liability -- The role of the judiciary in tort system expansion -- Current and future expansions of tort liability -- The "litigation explosion" : fact or fiction? -- Measures of the rate of expansion of tort liability -- The relationship between injury rates and tort system costs -- The impacts of substantial increases in tort lawyers' effective hourly rates -- Class actions -- Fees in class actions -- How class action lawyers game fee setting -- Securities class actions -- Regulation through litigation -- A new role for punitive damages : policy making as a profit center -- For-profit partnerships between state attorneys general and contingency fee lawyers.
서지주기
Includes bibliographical references and index.
일반주제명
Contingent fees -- United States. Torts -- Economic aspects -- United States.
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001 000045731458
005 20121212095218
008 121211s2011 nyu b 001 0 eng
010 ▼a 2010043979
020 ▼a 9781107001220 (hardback : alk. paper)
020 ▼a 1107001226 (hardback : alk. paper)
020 ▼a 9780521189491 (pbk. : alk. paper)
020 ▼a 0521189497 (pbk. : alk. paper)
035 ▼a (KERIS)REF000016438411
040 ▼a DLC ▼c DLC ▼d YDX ▼d YDXCP ▼d RCJ ▼d BWX ▼d DLC ▼d 211009
043 ▼a n-us---
050 0 0 ▼a KF310.C6 ▼b B75 2011
082 0 0 ▼a 347.73/77 ▼2 23
084 ▼a 347.7377 ▼2 DDCK
090 ▼a 347.7377 ▼b B849L
100 1 ▼a Brickman, Lester, ▼d 1940-.
245 1 0 ▼a Lawyer barons : ▼b what their contingency fees really cost America / ▼c Lester Brickman.
260 ▼a New York : ▼b Cambridge University Press, ▼c 2011.
300 ▼a xxv, 556 p. ; ▼c 24 cm.
504 ▼a Includes bibliographical references and index.
505 0 0 ▼t The origin of the contingency fee -- ▼t How profitable are contingency fees? -- ▼t Are contingency fee profits "reasonable"? -- ▼t How tort lawyers have increased their profits by restraining competition -- ▼t Why the market has failed to correct the absence of price competition -- ▼t Impediments imposed by the bar to price competition -- ▼t The effects of incentives created by contingency fees -- ▼t How the quest for profits influenced the development of the tort system -- ▼t Lawyers' role in the expansion of tort liability -- ▼t The role of the judiciary in tort system expansion -- ▼t Current and future expansions of tort liability -- ▼t The "litigation explosion" : fact or fiction? -- ▼t Measures of the rate of expansion of tort liability -- ▼t The relationship between injury rates and tort system costs -- ▼t The impacts of substantial increases in tort lawyers' effective hourly rates -- ▼t Class actions -- ▼t Fees in class actions -- ▼t How class action lawyers game fee setting -- ▼t Securities class actions -- ▼t Regulation through litigation -- ▼t A new role for punitive damages : policy making as a profit center -- ▼t For-profit partnerships between state attorneys general and contingency fee lawyers.
650 0 ▼a Contingent fees ▼z United States.
650 0 ▼a Torts ▼x Economic aspects ▼z United States.
740 0 2 ▼a Origin of the contingency fee.
740 0 2 ▼a Effects of incentives created by contingency fees.
740 0 2 ▼a Role of the judiciary in tort system expansion.
740 0 2 ▼a "Litigation explosion" : fact or fiction?
740 0 2 ▼a Relationship between injury rates and tort system costs.
740 0 2 ▼a Impacts of substantial increases in tort lawyers' effective hourly rates.
740 0 2 ▼a New role for punitive damages : policy making as a profit center.
945 ▼a KLPA

소장정보

No. 소장처 청구기호 등록번호 도서상태 반납예정일 예약 서비스
No. 1 소장처 중앙도서관/법학도서실(법학도서관 지하1층)/ 청구기호 347.7377 B849L 등록번호 111682273 도서상태 대출가능 반납예정일 예약 서비스 B M

컨텐츠정보

목차

1. The origin of the contingency fee; 2. How profitable are contingency fees?; 3. Are contingency fee profits 'reasonable'?; 4. How tort lawyers have increased their profits by restraining competition; 5. Why the market has failed to correct the absence of price competition; 6. Impediments imposed by the bar to price competition; 7. The effects of incentives created by contingency fees; 8. How the quest for profits influenced the development of the tort system; 9. Lawyers' role in the expansion of tort liability; 10. The role of the judiciary in tort system expansion; 11. Current and future expansions of tort liability; 12. The litigation explosion: 'fact or fiction'?; 13. Measures of the rate of expansion of tort liability; 14. The relationship between injury rates and tort system costs; 15. The impacts of substantial increases in tort lawyers' effective hourly rates; 16. Class actions; 17. Fees in class actions; 18. How class action lawyers game fee setting; 19. Securities class actions; 20. Regulation through litigation; 21. A new role for punitive damages: policy-making as a profit center; 22. For-profit partnerships between state attorneys general and contingency fee lawyers; Appendix A. A critique of Alex Tabarrok, the problem of contingent fees for waiters; Appendix B. Calculating tort lawyers' effective hourly rates in 1960; Appendix C. Electronic discovery and the use of contract lawyers; Appendix D. The HMO litigation; Appendix E. The GM 'side saddle' truck litigation: the (short lived) triumph of litigation over the regulatory process; Appendix F. Modern class actions undermine democratic precepts; Appendix G. Other ways lawyers game class action fees; Appendix H. Non-recourse financing of tort litigation; Appendix I. Political contributions by tort lawyers and the U.S. chamber of commerce; Appendix J. Special rules favoring lawyers; Appendix K. The ultimate medical expense 'build-up': whiplash; Appendix L. The effect of punitive damages on compensatory awards.


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