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Mathematics of social choice : voting, compensation, and division

Mathematics of social choice : voting, compensation, and division (2회 대출)

자료유형
단행본
개인저자
Borgers, Christoph.
단체저자명
Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics.
서명 / 저자사항
Mathematics of social choice : voting, compensation, and division / Christoph Borgers.
발행사항
Philadelphia :   Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics,   c2010.  
형태사항
xi, 245 p. : ill. ; 26 cm.
ISBN
9780898716955 0898716950
일반주기
Includes index.  
일반주제명
Voting -- Mathematical models. Elections -- Mathematical models. Social choice -- Mathematical models.
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100 1 ▼a Borgers, Christoph.
245 1 0 ▼a Mathematics of social choice : ▼b voting, compensation, and division / ▼c Christoph Borgers.
260 ▼a Philadelphia : ▼b Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, ▼c c2010.
300 ▼a xi, 245 p. : ▼b ill. ; ▼c 26 cm.
500 ▼a Includes index.
650 0 ▼a Voting ▼x Mathematical models.
650 0 ▼a Elections ▼x Mathematical models.
650 0 ▼a Social choice ▼x Mathematical models.
710 2 ▼a Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics.
945 ▼a KLPA

소장정보

No. 소장처 청구기호 등록번호 도서상태 반납예정일 예약 서비스
No. 1 소장처 중앙도서관/서고6층/ 청구기호 302.13015 B732m 등록번호 111627225 도서상태 대출가능 반납예정일 예약 서비스 B M

컨텐츠정보

목차

  • Preface
  • Part I: Voting: Chapter 1: Winner selection
  • Chapter 2: Rule of the majority
  • Chapter 3: Election spoilers
  • Chapter 4: The Smith set
  • Chapter 5: Smith-fairness and the no-weak-spoiler criterion
  • Chapter 6: Schulze’s beatpath method
  • Chapter 7: Monotonicity
  • Chapter 8: Elections with many or few voters
  • Chapter 9: Irrelevant comparisons and the Muller–Satterthwaite theorem
  • Chapter 10: Strategic voting and the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem
  • Chapter 11: Winner selection versus ranking
  • Chapter 12: Irrelevant alternatives and Arrow’s theorem
  • Part II: Compensation: Chapter 13: Fairness and envy-freeness
  • Chapter 14: Pareto-optimality and equitability
  • Chapter 15: Equality, equitability, and Knaster’s procedure
  • Part III: Division: Chapter 16: Envy-free, Pareto-optimal, and equitable cake cutting
  • Chapter 17: “I cut, you choose” for three: Steinhaus’s method
  • Chapter 18: Hall’s marriage theorem
  • Chapter 19: “I cut, you choose” for more than three: Kuhn’s methods
  • Chapter 20: The method of Selfridge and Conway
  • Chapter 21: The geometry of Pareto-optimal division between two people
  • Chapter 22: The adjusted winner method of Brams and Taylor
  • Chapter 23: Conflict resolution using the adjusted winner method
  • Chapter 24: The effect of dishonesty on the adjusted winner method
  • Chapter 25: Proportional allocation
  • Chapter 26: Dividing a piecewise homogeneous cake among N>2 people
  • Part IV: Appendices: Appendix A: Sets
  • Appendix B: Logic
  • Appendix C: Mathematical induction
  • Appendix D: Solutions to selected exercises
  • Index.

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