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Social choice mechanisms

Social choice mechanisms (Loan 1 times)

Material type
단행본
Personal Author
Danilov, V. I. (Vladimir Ivanovich), 1943-. Sotskov, A. I. (Aleksandr Ivanovich)
Title Statement
Social choice mechanisms / Vladimir I. Danilov, Alexander I. Sotskov.
Publication, Distribution, etc
Berlin ;   New York :   Springer,   c2002.  
Physical Medium
vi, 191 p. : ill. ; 25 cm.
Series Statement
Studies in economic design
ISBN
3540431055
Content Notes
Machine generated contents note: 1. Basic Concepts9 -- 1.1 Preferences9 -- 1.2 Social Choice Correspondences13 -- 1.3 Monotone Social Choice Correspondences19 -- 1.4 Social Choice Mechanisms25 -- 1.5 Effectivity Functions and Blockings30 -- 1.A1 Arrow's Impossibility Theorem35 -- 1.A2 Non-manipulable SCFs37 -- 1.A3 Minimal Monotone SCCs40 -- Bibliographic Comments43 -- 2. Nash-consistent Mechanisms45 -- 2.1 Definitions and Examples45 -- 2.2 Blockings Generated by Consistent Mechanisms50 -- 2.3 Strongly Monotone Social Choice Correspondences54 -- 2.4 Nash-implementable Correspondences58 -- 2.5 Implementation: the Case of Two Participants62 -- 2.6 Acceptable Mechanisms65 -- 2. A Simple Mechanism for the Implementation of Walrasian -- Equilibria68 -- Bibliographic Comments70 -- 3. Strategy-proof Mechanisms73 -- 3.1 Dominant Strategies. The Revelation Principle73 -- 3.2 Single-Peaked Environment78 -- 3.3 Linear Environment85 -- 3.4 The Transferable Environment. Groves Mechanisms 92 -- 3.5 Further Properties of Groves Mechanisms97 -- 3.A1 The Simple Transferable Environment Case105 -- 3.A2 Acceptable Mechanisms in Transferable Environment106 -- Bibliographic Comments108 -- 4. Cores and Stable Blockings111 -- 4.1 Stable Outcomes if -- 4.2 Additive Blockings 116 -- 4.3 Convex Blockings122 -- 4.4 Almost Additive Blockings 125 -- 4.5 Necessary Stability Conditions 128 -- 4.6 Veto as a Decision-making Procedure 132 -- 4.A1 Balanced Blockings138 -- 4.A2 Blockings with Infinite Number of Alternatives140 -- 4.A3 The Harems Lemma 141 -- Bibliographic Comments 142 -- 5. Strongly Consistent Mechanisms145 -- 5.1 Definitions and Examples 145 -- 5.2 A Tokens Mechanism (or Veto-mechanism) 149 -- 5.3 Blockings Generated by SC-mechanisms 153 -- 5.4 Direct Core Mechanisms158 -- 5.5 Laminable Blockings 163 -- 5.6 A Necessary and Sufficient Condition of Laminability 168 -- 5.7 Neutral Laminable Blockings 172 -- 5.A Implementation via Strong Equilibria 175 -- Bibliographic Comments180 -- References183 -- Index189.
Bibliography, Etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references (p. [183]-188) and index.
Subject Added Entry-Topical Term
Social choice -- Mathematical models.
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100 1 ▼a Danilov, V. I. ▼q (Vladimir Ivanovich), ▼d 1943-.
245 1 0 ▼a Social choice mechanisms / ▼c Vladimir I. Danilov, Alexander I. Sotskov.
260 ▼a Berlin ; ▼a New York : ▼b Springer, ▼c c2002.
300 ▼a vi, 191 p. : ▼b ill. ; ▼c 25 cm.
440 0 ▼a Studies in economic design
504 ▼a Includes bibliographical references (p. [183]-188) and index.
505 8 ▼a Machine generated contents note: 1. Basic Concepts9 -- 1.1 Preferences9 -- 1.2 Social Choice Correspondences13 -- 1.3 Monotone Social Choice Correspondences19 -- 1.4 Social Choice Mechanisms25 -- 1.5 Effectivity Functions and Blockings30 -- 1.A1 Arrow's Impossibility Theorem35 -- 1.A2 Non-manipulable SCFs37 -- 1.A3 Minimal Monotone SCCs40 -- Bibliographic Comments43 -- 2. Nash-consistent Mechanisms45 -- 2.1 Definitions and Examples45 -- 2.2 Blockings Generated by Consistent Mechanisms50 -- 2.3 Strongly Monotone Social Choice Correspondences54 -- 2.4 Nash-implementable Correspondences58 -- 2.5 Implementation: the Case of Two Participants62 -- 2.6 Acceptable Mechanisms65 -- 2. A Simple Mechanism for the Implementation of Walrasian -- Equilibria68 -- Bibliographic Comments70 -- 3. Strategy-proof Mechanisms73 -- 3.1 Dominant Strategies. The Revelation Principle73 -- 3.2 Single-Peaked Environment78 -- 3.3 Linear Environment85 -- 3.4 The Transferable Environment. Groves Mechanisms 92 -- 3.5 Further Properties of Groves Mechanisms97 -- 3.A1 The Simple Transferable Environment Case105 -- 3.A2 Acceptable Mechanisms in Transferable Environment106 -- Bibliographic Comments108 -- 4. Cores and Stable Blockings111 -- 4.1 Stable Outcomes if -- 4.2 Additive Blockings 116 -- 4.3 Convex Blockings122 -- 4.4 Almost Additive Blockings 125 -- 4.5 Necessary Stability Conditions 128 -- 4.6 Veto as a Decision-making Procedure 132 -- 4.A1 Balanced Blockings138 -- 4.A2 Blockings with Infinite Number of Alternatives140 -- 4.A3 The Harems Lemma 141 -- Bibliographic Comments 142 -- 5. Strongly Consistent Mechanisms145 -- 5.1 Definitions and Examples 145 -- 5.2 A Tokens Mechanism (or Veto-mechanism) 149 -- 5.3 Blockings Generated by SC-mechanisms 153 -- 5.4 Direct Core Mechanisms158 -- 5.5 Laminable Blockings 163 -- 5.6 A Necessary and Sufficient Condition of Laminability 168 -- 5.7 Neutral Laminable Blockings 172 -- 5.A Implementation via Strong Equilibria 175 -- Bibliographic Comments180 -- References183 -- Index189.
650 0 ▼a Social choice ▼x Mathematical models.
700 1 ▼a Sotskov, A. I. ▼q (Aleksandr Ivanovich)
945 ▼a KINS

Holdings Information

No. Location Call Number Accession No. Availability Due Date Make a Reservation Service
No. 1 Location Main Library/Western Books/ Call Number 302.130151 D186s Accession No. 111329330 Availability Available Due Date Make a Reservation Service B M

Contents information

Table of Contents

1. Basic Concepts.- 1.1 Preferences.- 1.2 Social Choice Correspondences.- 1.3 Monotone Social Choice Correspondences.- 1.4 Social Choice Mechanisms.- 1.5 Effectivity Functions and Blockings.- 1.A1 Arrow's Impossibility Theorem.- 1.A2 Non-manipulable SCFs.- 1.A3 Minimal Monotone SCCs.- Bibliographic Comments.- 2. Nash-consistent Mechanisms.- 2.1 Definitions and Examples.- 2.2 Blockings Generated by Consistent Mechanisms.- 2.3 Strongly Monotone Social Choice Correspondences.- 2.4 Nash-implementable Correspondences.- 2.5 Implementation: the Case of Two Participants.- 2.6 Acceptable Mechanisms.- 2.A A Simple Mechanism for the Implementation of Walrasian Equilibria.- Bibliographic Comments.- 3. Strategy-proof Mechanisms.- 3.1 Dominant Strategies. The Revelation Principle.- 3.2 Single-Peaked Environment.- 3.3 Linear Environment.- 3.4 The Transferable Environment. Groves Mechanisms.- 3.5 Further Properties of Groves Mechanisms.- 3.A1 The Simple Transferable Environment Case.- 3.A2 Acceptable Mechanisms in Transferable Environment.- Bibliographic Comments.- 4. Cores and Stable Blockings.- 4.1 Stable Outcomes.- 4.2 Additive Blockings.- 4.3 Convex Blockings.- 4.4 Almost Additive Blockings.- 4.5 Necessary Stability Conditions.- 4.6 Veto as a Decision-making Procedure.- 4.A1 Balanced Blockings.- 4.A2 Blockings with Infinite Number of Alternatives.- 4.A3 The Harems Lemma.- Bibliographic Comments.- 5. Strongly Consistent Mechanisms.- 5.1 Definitions and Examples.- 5.2 A Tokens Mechanism (or Veto-mechanism).- 5.3 Blockings Generated by SC-mechanisms.- 5.4 Direct Core Mechanisms.- 5.5 Laminable Blockings.- 5.6 A Necessary and Sufficient Condition of Laminability.- 5.7 Neutral Laminable Blockings.- 5.A Implementation via Strong Equilibria.- Bibliographic Comments.- References.


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