CONTENTS
Preface = xi
PART Ⅰ: DIRECT REFERENCE IN LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT = 1
Introduction = 3
Ⅰ.1 De re communication = 5
1 Direct reference and linguistic meaning: rigidity de jure = 7
1.1 Introduction = 7
1.2 Rigidity and scope = 7
1.3 Rigidity and referentiality = 10
1.4 Lockwood's criterion = 13
1.5 Type-referentiality = 16
1.6 Referentiality, meaning, and psychology = 19
2. Singular propositions and thoughts = 26
2.1 Truth-conditions, meaning, and propositional content = 26
2.2 Content and character: the neo-Russellian theory = 28
2.3 Quasi-singular propositions: the neo-Fregean theory = 31
2.4 Propositional content and thought = 34
2.5 Two basic intuitions = 38
3. The communication of de re thoughts = 45
3.1 Introduction = 45
3.2 Singular propositions in a neo-Fregean framework = 46
3.3 Interpretation in de re communication = 48
3.4 Communication and subjectivity = 53
Ⅰ.2 From language to thought = 61
4. Linguistic and psychological modes of presentation = 63
4.1 Introduction = 63
4.2 Linguistic meaning and narrow content: the Simplified Picture = 66
4.3 Two sorts of mode of presentation = 69
4.4 Systematic differences between linguistic and psychological modes of presentation = 72
4.5 Conclusion = 76
5. The meaning and cognitive significance of indexical expressions = 80
5.1 Introduction = 80
5.2 Rebutting the constancy argument = 80
5.3 The Simplified Picture again = 84
5.4 Immunity to error through misidentification = 87
5.5 Conclusion = 90
Ⅰ.3 De re thoughts = 95
6. De re modes of presentation = 97
6.1 Introduction = 97
6.2 Non-descriptiveness and relationality = 98
6.3 Non-descriptiveness and truth-conditional irrelevance = 103
6.4 Truth-conditional irrelevance and relationality = 106
6.5 Non-descriptiveness as descriptive multiplicity = 109
6.6 Non-descriptiveness and iconicity = 112
7. Egocentric concepts vs. encyclopedia entries = 119
7.1 Introduction = 119
7.2 Indexicality and perception = 120
7.3 From 'buffers' to egocentric concepts = 122
7.4 Stable and unstable object files = 125
7.5 Conclusion = 129
Ⅰ.4 Proper names = 133
8. The meaning of proper names = 135
8.1 Introduction = 135
8.2 The character of proper names = 136
8.3 Proper names as indexicals = 140
8.4 Indexicality or homonymy? = 143
8.5 Localness = 146
8.6 The individuation of languages = 149
9. Answering Kripke's objections = 155
9.1 Introduction = 155
9.2 The modal argument = 155
9.3 The circularity argument = 158
9.4 The generality argument = 161
9.5 Conclusion = 165
10. Proper names in thought = 168
10.1 Introduction = 168
10.2 Proper names, sortals, and demonstrative identification = 169
10.3 The psychological neutrality of proper names = 172
10.4 Descriptive names = 176
10.5 Proper names and encyclopedia entries = 181
Ⅰ.5 The two-component picture: a defence = 191
11. Narrow content and psychological explanation = 193
11.1 Neo-Fregeanism and the two-component picture = 193
11.2 Alleged arguments for the two-component picture = 197
11.3 Narrow content in psychological explanation = 202
11.4 The empty case = 206
12. Externalism and the two-component picture = 209
12.1 Can thoughts be schematic? = 209
12.2 The externalist objection = 211
12.3 Two forms of environment-dependence : the relative notion of narrowness = 213
12.4 Second-order narrow contents: the externalist's dilemma = 218
12.5 Holistic Externalism = 222
PART Ⅱ: THE PRAGMATICS OF DIRECT REFERENCE = 227
Introduction = 229
Ⅱ.1 Methodological preliminaries = 231
13. Truth-conditional pragmatics = 233
13.1 Enriching the Gricean picture: two sorts of pragmatic explanation = 233
13.2 Three minimalist principles = 240
13.3 The Implicature Analysis = 244
13.4 The Availability Principle = 246
13.5 Conclusion = 250
14. Primary pragmatic processes = 255
14.1 Introduction = 255
14.2 Can Minimalism be defended? = 256
14.3 Giving up Minimalism = 258
14.4 Primary and secondary pragmatic processes = 260
Appendix: Availability and the Scope Principle = 269
Ⅱ.2 Referential/attributive = 275
15. The referential use of definite descriptions = 277
15.1 Introduction = 277
15.2 Donnellan's presentation = 278
15.3 Improper uses and truth-conditional irrelevance: the intuitive basis of the Naive Theory = 281
15.4 An alleged argument for the Implicature Theory = 284
15.5 The Indeterminacy Theory = 288
15.6 The Synecdoche Theory = 293
16. The descriptive use of indexicals = 300
16.1 Introduction = 300
16.2 Nunberg's counter-examples: de re concepts in interpretation = 301
16.3 Other alleged counter-examples = 306
16.4 Nunberg's theory: the index/referent distinction generalized = 309
16.5 The basic level of interpretation = 312
16.6 Multi-layered pragmatics and direct reference theory = 316
Ⅱ.3 Belief reports = 323
17. Belief reports and conversational implicatures = 325
17.1 Accounting for opacity = 325
17.2 The Implicature Theory = 328
17.3 What's wrong with the Implicature Theory (1) = 335
17.4 What's wrong with the Implicature Theory (2) = 341
18. Belief reports and the semantics of 'that'-clauses = 348
18.1 Frege's Puzzle and the Relational principle = 348
18.2 Rejecting the Relational principle = 350
18.3 The reference of 'that'-clauses = 355
18.4 The context -sensitivity of 'that'-clauses = 357
19. Comparison with other accounts = 368
19.1 Unitary vs. dualist accounts of belief reports = 368
19.2 The incoherence of dualism = 370
19.3 The combined account = 375
19.4 Schematic belief reports = 379
20. How ambiguous are belief sentences? = 386
20.1 Introduction = 386
20.2 Definite descriptions in belief contexts = 386
20.3 Proper names in belief contexts = 393
20.4 Indexicals in belief contexts = 397
Bibliography = 403
Index = 413
