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Direct reference : from language to thought

Direct reference : from language to thought

자료유형
단행본
개인저자
Recanati, Francois, 1952-
서명 / 저자사항
Direct reference : from language to thought / Francois Recanati.
발행사항
Oxford, UK ;   Cambridge, Mass., USA :   Blackwell,   1993.  
형태사항
xiv, 420 p. ; 24 cm.
ISBN
0631181547 (acid-free paper)
서지주기
Includes bibliographies (p. [403]-412) and index.
일반주제명
Reference (Linguistics). Reference (Philosophy). Thought and thinking. Psycholinguistics. Language and languages --Philosophy. Pragmatics.
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010 ▼a 92029857
020 ▼a 0631181547 (acid-free paper)
040 ▼a DLC ▼c DLC ▼d DLC ▼d 244002
049 0 ▼l 452094365
050 0 0 ▼a P325.5.R44 ▼b R38 1993
082 0 0 ▼a 415 ▼2 20
090 ▼a 415 ▼b R294d
100 1 ▼a Recanati, Francois, ▼d 1952-
245 1 0 ▼a Direct reference : ▼b from language to thought / ▼c Francois Recanati.
260 ▼a Oxford, UK ; ▼a Cambridge, Mass., USA : ▼b Blackwell, ▼c 1993.
300 ▼a xiv, 420 p. ; ▼c 24 cm.
504 ▼a Includes bibliographies (p. [403]-412) and index.
650 0 ▼a Reference (Linguistics).
650 0 ▼a Reference (Philosophy).
650 0 ▼a Thought and thinking.
650 0 ▼a Psycholinguistics.
650 0 ▼a Language and languages ▼x Philosophy.
650 0 ▼a Pragmatics.

소장정보

No. 소장처 청구기호 등록번호 도서상태 반납예정일 예약 서비스
No. 1 소장처 세종학술정보원/인문자료실1/ 청구기호 415 R294d 등록번호 452094365 도서상태 대출가능 반납예정일 예약 서비스 C M

컨텐츠정보

목차


CONTENTS
Preface = xi
PART Ⅰ: DIRECT REFERENCE IN LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT = 1
 Introduction = 3
 Ⅰ.1 De re communication = 5
  1 Direct reference and linguistic meaning: rigidity de jure = 7
   1.1 Introduction = 7
   1.2 Rigidity and scope = 7
   1.3 Rigidity and referentiality = 10
   1.4 Lockwood's criterion = 13
   1.5 Type-referentiality = 16
   1.6 Referentiality, meaning, and psychology = 19
  2. Singular propositions and thoughts = 26
   2.1 Truth-conditions, meaning, and propositional content = 26
   2.2 Content and character: the neo-Russellian theory = 28
   2.3 Quasi-singular propositions: the neo-Fregean theory = 31
   2.4 Propositional content and thought = 34
   2.5 Two basic intuitions = 38
  3. The communication of de re thoughts = 45
   3.1 Introduction = 45
   3.2 Singular propositions in a neo-Fregean framework = 46
   3.3 Interpretation in de re communication = 48
   3.4 Communication and subjectivity = 53
 Ⅰ.2 From language to thought = 61
  4. Linguistic and psychological modes of presentation = 63
   4.1 Introduction = 63
   4.2 Linguistic meaning and narrow content: the Simplified Picture = 66
   4.3 Two sorts of mode of presentation = 69
   4.4 Systematic differences between linguistic and psychological modes of presentation = 72
   4.5 Conclusion = 76
  5. The meaning and cognitive significance of indexical  expressions = 80
   5.1 Introduction = 80
   5.2 Rebutting the constancy argument = 80
   5.3 The Simplified Picture again = 84
   5.4 Immunity to error through misidentification = 87
   5.5 Conclusion = 90
 Ⅰ.3 De re thoughts = 95
  6. De re modes of presentation = 97
   6.1 Introduction = 97
   6.2 Non-descriptiveness and relationality = 98
   6.3 Non-descriptiveness and truth-conditional irrelevance = 103
   6.4 Truth-conditional irrelevance and relationality = 106
   6.5 Non-descriptiveness as descriptive multiplicity = 109
   6.6 Non-descriptiveness and iconicity = 112
  7. Egocentric concepts vs. encyclopedia entries = 119
   7.1 Introduction = 119
   7.2 Indexicality and perception = 120
   7.3 From 'buffers' to egocentric concepts = 122
   7.4 Stable and unstable object files = 125
   7.5 Conclusion = 129
 Ⅰ.4 Proper names = 133
  8. The meaning of proper names = 135
   8.1 Introduction = 135
   8.2 The character of proper names = 136
   8.3 Proper names as indexicals = 140
   8.4 Indexicality or homonymy? = 143
   8.5 Localness = 146
   8.6 The individuation of languages = 149
  9. Answering Kripke's objections = 155
   9.1 Introduction = 155
   9.2 The modal argument = 155
   9.3 The circularity argument = 158
   9.4 The generality argument = 161
   9.5 Conclusion = 165
  10. Proper names in thought = 168
   10.1 Introduction = 168
   10.2 Proper names, sortals, and demonstrative identification = 169
   10.3 The psychological neutrality of proper names = 172
   10.4 Descriptive names = 176
   10.5 Proper names and encyclopedia entries = 181
 Ⅰ.5 The two-component picture: a defence = 191
  11. Narrow content and psychological explanation = 193
   11.1 Neo-Fregeanism and the two-component picture = 193
   11.2 Alleged arguments for the two-component picture = 197
   11.3 Narrow content in psychological explanation = 202
   11.4 The empty case = 206
  12. Externalism and the two-component picture = 209
   12.1 Can thoughts be schematic? = 209
   12.2 The externalist objection = 211
   12.3 Two forms of environment-dependence : the relative notion of narrowness = 213
   12.4 Second-order narrow contents: the externalist's dilemma = 218
   12.5 Holistic Externalism = 222
PART Ⅱ: THE PRAGMATICS OF DIRECT REFERENCE = 227
 Introduction = 229
 Ⅱ.1 Methodological preliminaries = 231
  13. Truth-conditional pragmatics = 233
   13.1 Enriching the Gricean picture: two sorts of pragmatic explanation = 233
   13.2 Three minimalist principles = 240
   13.3 The Implicature Analysis = 244
   13.4 The Availability Principle = 246
   13.5 Conclusion = 250
  14. Primary pragmatic processes = 255
   14.1 Introduction = 255
   14.2 Can Minimalism be defended? = 256
   14.3 Giving up Minimalism = 258
   14.4 Primary and secondary pragmatic processes = 260
Appendix: Availability and the Scope Principle = 269
 Ⅱ.2 Referential/attributive = 275
  15. The referential use of definite descriptions = 277
   15.1 Introduction = 277
   15.2 Donnellan's presentation = 278
   15.3 Improper uses and truth-conditional irrelevance: the intuitive basis of the Naive Theory = 281
   15.4 An alleged argument for the Implicature Theory = 284
   15.5 The Indeterminacy Theory = 288
   15.6 The Synecdoche Theory = 293
  16. The descriptive use of indexicals = 300
   16.1 Introduction = 300
   16.2 Nunberg's counter-examples: de re concepts in interpretation = 301
   16.3 Other alleged counter-examples = 306
   16.4 Nunberg's theory: the index/referent distinction generalized = 309
   16.5 The basic level of interpretation = 312
   16.6 Multi-layered pragmatics and direct reference theory = 316
 Ⅱ.3 Belief reports = 323
  17. Belief reports and conversational implicatures = 325
   17.1 Accounting for opacity = 325
   17.2 The Implicature Theory = 328
   17.3 What's wrong with the Implicature Theory (1) = 335
   17.4 What's wrong with the Implicature Theory (2) = 341
  18. Belief reports and the semantics of 'that'-clauses = 348
   18.1 Frege's Puzzle and the Relational principle = 348
   18.2 Rejecting the Relational principle = 350
   18.3 The reference of 'that'-clauses = 355
   18.4 The context -sensitivity of 'that'-clauses = 357
  19. Comparison with other accounts = 368
   19.1 Unitary vs. dualist accounts of belief reports = 368
   19.2 The incoherence of dualism = 370
   19.3 The combined account = 375
   19.4 Schematic belief reports = 379
  20. How ambiguous are belief sentences? = 386
   20.1 Introduction = 386
   20.2 Definite descriptions in belief contexts = 386
   20.3 Proper names in belief contexts = 393
   20.4 Indexicals in belief contexts = 397
Bibliography = 403
Index = 413


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