HOME > Detail View

Detail View

Microeconomic theory

Microeconomic theory (Loan 288 times)

Material type
단행본
Personal Author
Mas-Colell, Andreu. Whinston, Michael Dennis. Green, Jerry R.
Title Statement
Microeconomic theory / Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael D. Whinston, and Jerry R. Green.
Publication, Distribution, etc
New York :   Oxford University Press,   1995.  
Physical Medium
xvii, 981 p. : ill. ; 26 cm.
ISBN
0195073401 (alk. paper) 0195102681 (pbk. : alk. paper)
Bibliography, Etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Subject Added Entry-Topical Term
Microeconomics.
비통제주제어
Microeconomics ,,
000 00966camuu2200289 a 4500
001 000000874558
005 20140923144234
008 950418s1995 nyua b 001 0 eng
010 ▼a 95018128
020 ▼a 0195073401 (alk. paper)
020 ▼a 0195102681 (pbk. : alk. paper)
040 ▼a DLC ▼c DLC ▼d UIU ▼d UKM ▼d GZM ▼d 211009
049 ▼a KUBA ▼l 111280640
050 0 0 ▼a HB172 ▼b .M6247 1995
082 0 0 ▼a 338.5 ▼2 23
084 ▼a 338.5 ▼2 DDCK
090 ▼a 338.5 ▼b M394m
100 1 ▼a Mas-Colell, Andreu.
245 1 0 ▼a Microeconomic theory / ▼c Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael D. Whinston, and Jerry R. Green.
260 ▼a New York : ▼b Oxford University Press, ▼c 1995.
300 ▼a xvii, 981 p. : ▼b ill. ; ▼c 26 cm.
504 ▼a Includes bibliographical references and index.
650 0 ▼a Microeconomics.
653 0 ▼a Microeconomics
700 1 ▼a Whinston, Michael Dennis.
700 1 ▼a Green, Jerry R.

No. Location Call Number Accession No. Availability Due Date Make a Reservation Service
No. 1 Location Main Library/Western Books/ Call Number 338.5 M394m Accession No. 111280640 Availability Available Due Date Make a Reservation Service B M
No. 2 Location Main Library/Western Books/ Call Number 338.5 M394m Accession No. 111437635 Availability In loan Due Date 2022-07-20 Make a Reservation Service M
No. 3 Location Main Library/Western Books/ Call Number 338.5 M394m Accession No. 111723646 Availability In loan Due Date 2022-07-29 Make a Reservation Service M
No. 4 Location Main Library/Western Books/ Call Number 338.5 M394m Accession No. 111788541 Availability Available Due Date Make a Reservation Service B M
No. 5 Location Science & Engineering Library/Sci-Info(Stacks2)/ Call Number 338.5 M394m Accession No. 121131347 Availability In loan Due Date 2022-08-01 Make a Reservation Service M
No. 6 Location Science & Engineering Library/Sci-Info(Stacks2)/ Call Number 338.5 M394m Accession No. 121239761 Availability Available Due Date Make a Reservation Service B M
No. 7 Location Sejong Academic Information Center/Social Science/ Call Number 338.5 M394m Accession No. 151101677 Availability Available Due Date Make a Reservation Service M
No. Location Call Number Accession No. Availability Due Date Make a Reservation Service
No. 1 Location Main Library/Western Books/ Call Number 338.5 M394m Accession No. 111280640 Availability Available Due Date Make a Reservation Service B M
No. 2 Location Main Library/Western Books/ Call Number 338.5 M394m Accession No. 111437635 Availability In loan Due Date 2022-07-20 Make a Reservation Service M
No. 3 Location Main Library/Western Books/ Call Number 338.5 M394m Accession No. 111723646 Availability In loan Due Date 2022-07-29 Make a Reservation Service M
No. 4 Location Main Library/Western Books/ Call Number 338.5 M394m Accession No. 111788541 Availability Available Due Date Make a Reservation Service B M
No. Location Call Number Accession No. Availability Due Date Make a Reservation Service
No. 1 Location Science & Engineering Library/Sci-Info(Stacks2)/ Call Number 338.5 M394m Accession No. 121131347 Availability In loan Due Date 2022-08-01 Make a Reservation Service M
No. 2 Location Science & Engineering Library/Sci-Info(Stacks2)/ Call Number 338.5 M394m Accession No. 121239761 Availability Available Due Date Make a Reservation Service B M
No. Location Call Number Accession No. Availability Due Date Make a Reservation Service
No. 1 Location Sejong Academic Information Center/Social Science/ Call Number 338.5 M394m Accession No. 151101677 Availability Available Due Date Make a Reservation Service M

Contents information

Table of Contents


CONTENTS

Preface = xiii

PART ONE : INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKING = 3

Chapter 1. Preference and Choice = 5

 1.A Introduction = 5

 1.B Preference Relations = 6

 1.C Choice Rules = 9

 1.D The Relationship between Preference Relations and Choice Rules = 11

 Exercises = 15

Chapter 2. Consumer Choice = 17

 2.A Introduction = 17

 2.B Commodities = 17

 2.C The Consumption Set = 18

 2.D Competitive Budgets = 20

 2.E Demand Functions and Comparative Statics = 23

 2.F The Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference and the Law of Demand = 28

 Exercises = 36

Chapter 3. Classical Demand Theory = 40

 3.A Introduction = 40

 3.B Preference Relations : Basic Properties = 41

 3.C Preference and Utility = 46

 3.D The Utility Maximization Problem = 50

 3.E The Expenditure Minimization Problem = 57

 3.F Duality : A Mathematical Introduction = 63

 3.G Relationships between Demand, Indirect Utility, and Expenditure Functions = 67

 3.H Integrability = 75

 3.I Welfare Evaluation of Economic Changes = 80

 3.J The Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference = 91

 Appendix A : Continuity and Differentiability Properties of Walrasian Demand = 92

 Exercises = 96

Chapter 4. Aggregate Demand = 105

 4.A Introduction = 105

 4.B Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Wealth = 106

 4.C Aggregate Demand and the Weak Axiom = 109

 4.D Aggregate Demand and the Existence of a Representative Consumer = 116

 Appendix A : Regularizing Effects of Aggregation = 122

 Exercises = 123

Chapter 5. Production = 127

 5.A Introduction = 127

 5.B Production Sets = 128

 5.C Profit Maximization and Cost Minimization = 135

 5.D The Geometry of Cost and Supply in the Single-Output Case = 143

 5.E Aggregation = 147

 5.F Efficient Production = 149

 5.G Remarks on the Objectives of the Firm = 152

 Appendix A : The Linear Activity Model = 154

 Exercises = 160

Chapter 6. Choice Under Uncertainty = 167

 6.A Introduction = 167

 6.B Expected Utility Theory = 168

 6.C Money Lotteries and Risk Aversion = 183

 6.D Comparison of Payoff Distributions in Terms of Return and Risk = 194

 6.E State-dependent Utility = 199

 6.F Subjective Probability Theory = 205

 Exercises = 208

PART TWO : GAME THEORY = 217

Chapter 7. Basic Elements of Noncooperative Games = 219

 7.A Introduction = 219

 7.B What Is a Game? = 219

 7.C The Extensive Form Representation of a Game = 221

 7.D Strategies and the Normal Form Representation of a Game = 228

 7.E Randomized Choices = 231

 Exercises = 233

Chapter 8. Simultaneous-Move Games = 235

 8.A Introduction = 235

 8.B Dominant and Dominated Strategies = 236

 8.C Rationalizable Strategies = 242

 8.D Nash Equilibrium = 246

 8.E Games of Incomplete Information : Bayesian Nash Equilibrium = 253

 8.F The Possibility of Mistakes : Trembling-Hand Perfection = 258

 Appendix A : Existence of Hash Equilibrium = 260

 Exercises = 262

Chapter 9. Dynamic Games = 267

 9.A Introduction = 267

 9.B Sequential Rationality, Backward Induction, and Subgame Perfection = 268

 9.C Beliefs and Sequential Rationality = 282

 9.D Reasonable Beliefs and Forward Induction = 292

 Appendix A : Finite and Infinite Horizon Bilateral Bargaining = 296

 Appendix B : Extensive Form Trembling-Hand Perfect Nash Equilibrium = 299

 Exercises = 301

PART THREE : MARKET EQUILIBRIUM AND MARKET FAILURE = 307

Chapter 10. Competitive Markets = 311

 10.A Introduction = 311

 10.B Pareto Optimality and Competitive Equilibria = 312

 10.C Partial Equilibrium Competitive Analysis = 316

 10.D The Fundamental Welfare Theorems in a Partial Equilibrium Context = 325

 10.E Welfare Analysis in the Partial Equilibrium Model = 328

 10.F Free-Entry and Long-Run Competitive Equilibria = 334

 10.G Concluding Remarks on Partial Equilibrium Analysis = 341

 Exercises = 344

Chapter 11. Externalities and Public Goods = 350

 11.A Introduction = 350

 11.B A Simple Bilateral Externality = 351

 11.C Public Goods = 359

 11.D Multilateral Externalities = 364

 11.E Private Information and Second-Best Solutions = 368

 Appendix A : Nonconvexities and the Theory of Externalities = 374

 Exercises = 378

Chapter 12. Market Power = 383

 12.4 Introduction = 383

 12.B Monopoly Pricing = 384

 12.C Static Models of Oligopoly = 387

 12.D Repeated Interaction = 400

 12.E Entry = 405

 12.F The Competitive Limit = 411

 12.G Strategic Precommitments to Affect Future Competition = 414

 Appendix A : Infinitely Repeated Games and the Folk Theorem = 417

 Appendix B : Strategic Entry Deterrence and Accommodation = 423

 Exercises = 428

Chapter 13. Adverse Selection, Signaling, and Screening = 436

 13.A Introduction = 436

 13.B Informational Asymmetries and Adverse Selection = 437

 13.C Signaling = 450

 13.D Screening = 460

 Appendix A : Reasonable-Beliefs Refinements in Signaling Games = 467

 Exercises = 473

Chapter 14. The Principal-Agent Problem = 477

 14.A Introduction = 477

 14.B Hidden Actions (Moral Hazard) = 478

 14.C Hidden Information(and Monopolistic Screening) = 488

 14.D Hidden Actions and Hidden Information : Hybrid Models = 501

 Appendix A : Multiple Effort Levels in the Hidden Action Model = 502

 Exercises = 507

PART FOUR : GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM = 511

Chapter 15. General Equilibrium Theory : Some Examples = 515

 15.A Introduction = 515

 15.B Pure Exchange : The Edgeworth Box = 515

 15.C The One-Consumer, One-Producer Economy = 525

 15.D The 2 ×2 Production Model = 529

 15.E General Versus Partial Equilibrium Theory = 538

 Exercises = 540

Chapter 16. Equilibrium and Its Basic Welfare Properties = 545

 16.A Introduction = 545

 16.B The Basic Model and Definitions = 546

 16.C The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics = 549

 16.D The Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics = 551

 16.E Pareto Optimality and Social Welfare Optima = 558

 16.F First-Order Conditions for Pareto Optimality = 561

 16.G Some Applications = 566

 Appendix A : Technical Properties of the Set of Feasible Allocations = 573

 Exercises = 575

Chapter 17. The Positive Theory of Equilibrium = 578

 17.A Introduction = 578

 17.B Equilibrium : Definitions and Basic Equations = 579

 17.C Existence of Walrasian Equilibrium = 584

 17.D Local Uniqueness and the Index Theorem = 589

 17.E Anything Goes : The Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu Theorem = 598

 17.F Uniqueness of Equilibria = 606

 17.G Comparative Statics Analysis = 616

 17.H T$$\hat a$$tonnement Stability = 620

 17.I Large Economies and Nonconvexities = 627

 Appendix A : Characterizing Equilibrium through Welfare Equations = 630

 Appendix B : A General Approach to the Existence of Walrasian Equilibrium = 632

 Exercises = 641

Chapter 18. Some Foundations for Competitive Equilibria = 652

 18.A Introduction = 652

 18.B Core and Equilibria = 652

 18.C Noncooperative Foundations of Walrasian Equilibria = 660

 18.D The Limits to Redistribution = 665

 18.E Equilibrium and the Marginal Productivity Principle = 670

 Appendix A : Cooperative Game Theory = 673

 Exercises = 684

Chapter 19. General Equilibrium Under Uncertainty = 687

 19.A Introduction = 687

 19.B A Market Economy with Contingent Commodities : Description = 688

 19.C Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium = 691

 19.D Sequential Trade = 694

 19.E Asset Markets = 699

 19.F Incomplete Markets = 709

 19.G Firm Behavior in General Equilibrium Models Under Uncertainty = 713

 19.H Imperfect Information = 716

 Exercises = 725

Chapter 20. Equilibrium and Time = 732

 20.A Introduction = 732

 20.B Intertemporal Utility = 733

 20.C Intertemporal Production and Efficiency = 736

 20.D Equilibrium : The One-Consumer Case = 743

 20.E Stationary Paths, Interest Rates, and Golden Rules = 754

 20.F Dynamics = 759

 20.G Equilibrium : Several Consumers = 765

 20.H Overlapping Generations = 769

 20.I Remarks on Nonequilibrium Dynamics : T$$\hat a$$tonnement and Learning = 778

 Exercises = 782

PART FIVE : WELFARE ECONOMICS AND INCENTIVES = 787

Chapter 21. Social Choice Theory = 789

 21.A Introduction = 789

 21.B A Special Case : Social Preferences over Two Alternatives = 790

 21.C The General Case : Arrow's Impossibility Theorem = 792

 21.D Some Possibility Results : Restricted Domains = 799

 21.E Social Choice Functions = 807

 Exercises = 812

Chapter 22. Elements of Welfare Economics and Axiomatic Bargaining = 817

 22.A Introduction = 817

 22.B Utility Possibility Sets = 818

 22.C Social Welfare Functions and Social Optima = 825

 22.D Invariance Properties of Social Welfare Functions = 831

 22.E The Axiomatic Bargaining Approach = 838

 22.F Coalitional Bargaining : The Shapley Value = 846

 Exercises = 850

Chapter 23. Incentives and Mechanism Design = 857

 23.A Introduction = 857

 23.B The Mechanism Design Problem = 858

 23.C Dominant Strategy Implementation = 869

 23.D Bayesian Implementation = 883

 23.E Participation Constraints = 891

 23.F Optimal Bayesian Mechanisms = 897

 Appendix A : Implementation and Multiple Equilibria = 910

 Appendix B : Implementation in Environments with Complete Information = 912

 Exercises = 918

MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX = 926

 M.A Matrix Notation for Derivatives = 926

 M.B Homogeneous Functions and Euler's Formula = 928

 M.C Concave and Quasiconcave Functions = 930

 M.D Matrices : Negative(Semi)Definiteness and Other Properties = 935

 M.E The Implicit Function Theorem = 940

 M.F Continuous Functions and Compact Sets = 943

 M.G Convex Sets and Separating Hyperplanes = 946

 M.H Correspondences = 949

 M.I Fixed Point Theorems = 952

 M.J Unconstrained Maximization = 954

 M.K Constrained Maximization = 956

 M.L The Envelope Theorem = 964

 M.M Linear Programming = 966

 M.N Dynamic Programming = 969

Index = 971



New Arrivals Books in Related Fields

최낙섭 (2022)
강성진 (2022)