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Game theory and economic modelling

Game theory and economic modelling (10회 대출)

자료유형
단행본
개인저자
Kreps, David M.
서명 / 저자사항
Game theory and economic modelling / David M. Kreps.
발행사항
Oxford :   Clarendon Press ;   New York :   Oxford University Press ,   1990.  
형태사항
viii, 195 p. : ill. ; 23 cm.
ISBN
0198283571 0198283814 (pbk.) 9780198283812
일반주기
"Clarendon lectures in economics"--Jacket.  
서지주기
Includes bibliographical references (p. [187]-191) and index.
일반주제명
Game theory. Econometric models. Cooperation. Competition.
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020 ▼a 0198283814 (pbk.)
020 ▼a 9780198283812
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100 1 ▼a Kreps, David M.
245 1 0 ▼a Game theory and economic modelling / ▼c David M. Kreps.
260 ▼a Oxford : ▼b Clarendon Press ; ▼a New York : ▼b Oxford University Press , ▼c 1990.
300 ▼a viii, 195 p. : ▼b ill. ; ▼c 23 cm.
500 ▼a "Clarendon lectures in economics"--Jacket.
504 ▼a Includes bibliographical references (p. [187]-191) and index.
650 0 ▼a Game theory.
650 0 ▼a Econometric models.
650 0 ▼a Cooperation.
650 0 ▼a Competition.
740 0 ▼a Clarendon lectures in economics.
945 ▼a KINS

소장정보

No. 소장처 청구기호 등록번호 도서상태 반납예정일 예약 서비스
No. 1 소장처 과학도서관/Sci-Info(2층서고)/ 청구기호 330.015118 K92g 등록번호 121152511 도서상태 대출가능 반납예정일 예약 서비스 B M

컨텐츠정보

목차


CONTENTS

1 Introduction = 1

2 The standard = 5

3 Base notions of non-cooperative game theory = 9

 Strategic form games = 10

 Extensive form games = 13

 Extensive and strategic form games = 21

 Dominance = 26

 Nash equilibrium = 28

4 The successes of game theory = 37

 Taxonomy based on the strategic form = 37

 Dynamics and extensive form games = 41

 Incredible threats and incredible promises = 45

 Credible threats and promises : Co-operation and reputation = 65

 The importance of what players know about others = 77

 Interactions among parties holding private information = 82

 Concluding remarks = 87

5 The problems of game theory = 91

 The need for precise protocols = 92

 Too many equilibria and no way to choose = 95

 Choosing among equilibria with refinements = 108

 The rules of the game = 128

6 Bounded rationality and retrospection = 133

 Why study Nash equilibria? = 134

 The case for bounded rationality and retrospection  = 150

 A line of attack = 154

 Historical antecedents and recent examples = 156

 Objections to this general approach, with rebuttals = 168

 Similarities : Or, Deduction and prospection is bounded rationality and retrospection = 169

 The other problems of game theory = 177

 Final words = 184

Bibliography = 187

Index = 193



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