
000 | 00975camuu2200277 a 4500 | |
001 | 000000740958 | |
005 | 20011214101421 | |
008 | 960625s1996 maua b 001 0 eng | |
010 | ▼a 96028939 | |
020 | ▼a 0792397118 | |
040 | ▼a DLC ▼c DLC ▼d OCL ▼d 211009 | |
049 | 1 | ▼l 111201323 |
050 | 0 0 | ▼a HB846.8 ▼b .C654 1996 |
082 | 0 0 | ▼a 302/.13 ▼2 20 |
090 | ▼a 302.13 ▼b C697 | |
245 | 0 0 | ▼a Collective decision-making : ▼b social choice and political economy / ▼c edited by Norman Schofield with the assistance of Annette Milford. |
260 | ▼a Boston : ▼b Kluwer Academic Publishers, ▼c 1996. | |
300 | ▼a xvii, 422 p. : ▼b ill. ; ▼c 24 cm. | |
440 | 0 | ▼a Recent economic thought series |
504 | ▼a Includes bibliographical references and indexes. | |
650 | 0 | ▼a Social choice. |
650 | 0 | ▼a Political science ▼x Economic aspects. |
650 | 0 | ▼a Group decision making. |
700 | 1 | ▼a Schofield, Norman , ▼d 1944- |
700 | 1 | ▼a Milford, Annette. |
소장정보
No. | 소장처 | 청구기호 | 등록번호 | 도서상태 | 반납예정일 | 예약 | 서비스 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
No. 1 | 소장처 중앙도서관/서고6층/ | 청구기호 302.13 C697 | 등록번호 111201323 | 도서상태 대출가능 | 반납예정일 | 예약 | 서비스 |
컨텐츠정보
목차
Editor's Preface. Foreword; W.H. Riker. 1. Introduction: Research Programs in Preference and Belief Aggregation; N. Schofield. Part I: Social Choice. 2. An Introduction to Arrovian Social Welfare Functions on Economic and Political Domains; M. le Breton, J. Weymark. 3. Social Ranking of Allocations with and without Coalition Formation; D.E. Campbell. 4. Non Binary Social Choice: A Brief Introduction; Yongsheng Xu. 5. Election Relations and a Partial Ordering for Positional Voting; D.G. Saari. Part II: Elections and Committees. 6. Electing Legislatures; D. Austen- Smith. 7. Preference-Based Stability: Experiments on Cooperative Solutions to Majority Rule Games; C.L. Eavey. 8. The Heart of a Polity; N. Schofield. 9. Refinements of the Heart; D. Austen-Smith. Part III: Coalition Governments. 10. Bargaining in the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan; J. Wada, N. Schofield. 11. An Analysis of the Euskarian Parliament; F. Carreras, G. Owen. 12. Extending a Dynamic Model of Protocoalition Formation; B. Grofman. 13. The Sequential Dynamics of Cabinet Formation, Stochastic Error, and a Test of Competing Models; B. Grofman, et al. 14. Subgame-Perfect Portfolio Allocations in Parliamentary Government Formation; M. Laver, K. Shepsle. 15. The Costs of Coalition: The Italian Anomaly; C. Mershon. Part IV: Political Economy. 16. Models of Interest Groups: Four Different Approaches; J. Potters, F. van Winden. 17. Partisan Electoral Cycles and Monetary Policy Games; R.B. Morton. 18. Hypothesis Testing and Collective Decision-Making; K.K. Ladha. 19. Political Discourse, Factions, and the General Will: Correlated Voting and Condorcet's Jury Theorem; K.K. Ladha, G. Miller. Name Index. Subject Index.
정보제공 :
