| 000 | 01171camuu2200325 a 4500 | |
| 001 | 000000704027 | |
| 005 | 20101126163203 | |
| 008 | 980825s1999 miua b 001 0 eng | |
| 010 | ▼a 98042902 | |
| 020 | ▼a 0472104802 (cloth : alk. paper) | |
| 040 | ▼a DLC ▼c DLC ▼d 211009 | |
| 049 | 1 | ▼l 111184136 |
| 050 | 0 0 | ▼a JA71 ▼b .A76 1999 |
| 082 | 0 0 | ▼a 320/.01/1 ▼2 22 |
| 084 | ▼a 320.011 ▼2 DDCK | |
| 090 | ▼a 320.011 ▼b A934p ▼c 1 | |
| 100 | 1 | ▼a Austen-Smith, David. |
| 245 | 1 0 | ▼a Positive political theory I : ▼b collective preference / ▼c David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey S. Banks. |
| 246 | 3 | ▼a Positive political theory one |
| 260 | ▼a Ann Arbor : ▼b University of Michigan Press, ▼c c1999. | |
| 300 | ▼a xv, 208 p. : ▼b ill. ; ▼c 24 cm. | |
| 490 | 1 | ▼a Michigan studies in political analysis |
| 504 | ▼a Includes bibliographical references (p. 195-201) and index. | |
| 650 | 0 | ▼a Political science ▼x Methodology. |
| 650 | 0 | ▼a Political science ▼x Decision making. |
| 650 | 0 | ▼a Rational choice theory. |
| 650 | 0 | ▼a Social choice. |
| 700 | 1 | ▼a Banks, Jeffrey S. |
| 830 | 0 | ▼a Michigan studies in political analysis. |
소장정보
| No. | 소장처 | 청구기호 | 등록번호 | 도서상태 | 반납예정일 | 예약 | 서비스 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| No. 1 | 소장처 중앙도서관/서고6층/ | 청구기호 320.011 A934p 1 | 등록번호 111184136 | 도서상태 대출가능 | 반납예정일 | 예약 | 서비스 |
컨텐츠정보
목차
CONTENTS Acknowledgments = ⅸ Preface = xi 1 Choice and Preference = 1 1.1 Preference-driven choice = 1 1.2 Rationalizable choice = 6 1.3 Application: The unitary actor assumption = 12 1.4 Transitive rationalizability = 12 1.5 Application: Choice of coalitional partners = 18 1.6 Discussion = 19 1.7 Exercises = 21 1.8 Further reading = 23 2 Power and Collective Rationality = 25 2.1 Aggregation and Arrow's Theorem = 26 2.2 Application: Choosing a representative = 38 2.3 Quasi-transitive and acylic rules = 39 2.4 Decisive sets and filters = 46 2.5 Collective choice rules = 49 2.6 Discussion = 52 2.7 Exercises = 54 2.8 Further reading = 55 3 Restricting Outcomes = 57 3.1 Decisive coalitions and simple rules = 58 3.2 Acyclic simple rules = 63 3.3 Application: A comparison of simple rules = 70 3.4 Voting rules = 71 3.5 Counting rules = 77 3.6 Discussion = 88 3.7 Exercises = 90 3.8 Further reading = 91 4 Restricting Preferences = 93 4.1 Single-peaked preferences = 94 4.2 Core characterization = 99 4.3 One-dimensional outcome space = 102 4.4 Application: Public goods provision = 104 4.5 Order-restricted preferences = 106 4.6 Application: Collective choice of tax-rates = 113 4.7 Discussion = 115 4.8 Exercises = 117 4.9 Further reading = 118 5 The Spatial Model = 119 5.1 Choosing from a continuum = 122 5.2 Core existence = 126 5.3 Application: Distributive politics = 132 5.4 Characterizing core points = 133 5.5 Discussion = 151 5.6 Exercises = 152 5.7 Further reading = 153 6 Instability and Chaos = 155 6.1 Generic nonexistence of core points = 156 6.2 Application: Distributive politics revisited = 167 6.3 Cycles = 168 6.4 Discussion = 184 6.5 Exercises = 185 6.6 Further reading = 185 7 Summary and Conclusions = 187 7.1 Social choice = 190 7.2 Game theory = 192 Bibliography = 195 Index = 202