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Positive political theory I : collective preference

Positive political theory I : collective preference (15회 대출)

자료유형
단행본
개인저자
Austen-Smith, David. Banks, Jeffrey S.
서명 / 저자사항
Positive political theory I : collective preference / David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey S. Banks.
발행사항
Ann Arbor :   University of Michigan Press,   c1999.  
형태사항
xv, 208 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
총서사항
Michigan studies in political analysis
ISBN
0472104802 (cloth : alk. paper)
서지주기
Includes bibliographical references (p. 195-201) and index.
일반주제명
Political science -- Methodology. Political science -- Decision making. Rational choice theory. Social choice.
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001 000000704027
005 20101126163203
008 980825s1999 miua b 001 0 eng
010 ▼a 98042902
020 ▼a 0472104802 (cloth : alk. paper)
040 ▼a DLC ▼c DLC ▼d 211009
049 1 ▼l 111184136
050 0 0 ▼a JA71 ▼b .A76 1999
082 0 0 ▼a 320/.01/1 ▼2 22
084 ▼a 320.011 ▼2 DDCK
090 ▼a 320.011 ▼b A934p ▼c 1
100 1 ▼a Austen-Smith, David.
245 1 0 ▼a Positive political theory I : ▼b collective preference / ▼c David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey S. Banks.
246 3 ▼a Positive political theory one
260 ▼a Ann Arbor : ▼b University of Michigan Press, ▼c c1999.
300 ▼a xv, 208 p. : ▼b ill. ; ▼c 24 cm.
490 1 ▼a Michigan studies in political analysis
504 ▼a Includes bibliographical references (p. 195-201) and index.
650 0 ▼a Political science ▼x Methodology.
650 0 ▼a Political science ▼x Decision making.
650 0 ▼a Rational choice theory.
650 0 ▼a Social choice.
700 1 ▼a Banks, Jeffrey S.
830 0 ▼a Michigan studies in political analysis.

소장정보

No. 소장처 청구기호 등록번호 도서상태 반납예정일 예약 서비스
No. 1 소장처 중앙도서관/서고6층/ 청구기호 320.011 A934p 1 등록번호 111184136 도서상태 대출가능 반납예정일 예약 서비스 B M

컨텐츠정보

목차


CONTENTS

Acknowledgments = ⅸ

Preface = xi

1 Choice and Preference = 1

 1.1 Preference-driven choice = 1

 1.2 Rationalizable choice = 6

 1.3 Application: The unitary actor assumption = 12

 1.4 Transitive rationalizability = 12

 1.5 Application: Choice of coalitional partners = 18

 1.6 Discussion = 19

 1.7 Exercises = 21

 1.8 Further reading = 23

2 Power and Collective Rationality = 25

 2.1 Aggregation and Arrow's Theorem = 26

 2.2 Application: Choosing a representative = 38

 2.3 Quasi-transitive and acylic rules = 39

 2.4 Decisive sets and filters = 46

 2.5 Collective choice rules = 49

 2.6 Discussion = 52

 2.7 Exercises = 54

 2.8 Further reading = 55

3 Restricting Outcomes = 57

 3.1 Decisive coalitions and simple rules = 58

 3.2 Acyclic simple rules = 63

 3.3 Application: A comparison of simple rules = 70

 3.4 Voting rules = 71

 3.5 Counting rules = 77

 3.6 Discussion = 88

 3.7 Exercises = 90

 3.8 Further reading = 91

4 Restricting Preferences = 93

 4.1 Single-peaked preferences = 94

 4.2 Core characterization = 99

 4.3 One-dimensional outcome space = 102

 4.4 Application: Public goods provision = 104

 4.5 Order-restricted preferences = 106

 4.6 Application: Collective choice of tax-rates = 113

 4.7 Discussion = 115

 4.8 Exercises = 117

 4.9 Further reading = 118

5 The Spatial Model = 119

 5.1 Choosing from a continuum = 122

 5.2 Core existence = 126

 5.3 Application: Distributive politics = 132

 5.4 Characterizing core points = 133

 5.5 Discussion = 151

 5.6 Exercises = 152

 5.7 Further reading = 153

6 Instability and Chaos = 155

 6.1 Generic nonexistence of core points = 156

 6.2 Application: Distributive politics revisited = 167

 6.3 Cycles = 168

 6.4 Discussion = 184

 6.5 Exercises = 185

 6.6 Further reading = 185

7 Summary and Conclusions = 187

 7.1 Social choice = 190

 7.2 Game theory = 192

Bibliography = 195

Index = 202



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