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Modeling bounded rationality

Modeling bounded rationality (Loan 9 times)

Material type
단행본
Personal Author
Rubinstein, Ariel.
Title Statement
Modeling bounded rationality / Ariel Rubinstein.
Publication, Distribution, etc
Cambridge, Mass. :   MIT Press,   c1998.  
Physical Medium
viii, 208 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
Series Statement
Zeuthen lecture book series
ISBN
0262181878 (hardcover : alk. paper) 0262681005 (pbk. : alk. paper)
Bibliography, Etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references (p. [195]-201) and index.
Subject Added Entry-Topical Term
Decision making. Economic man. Game theory. Rational expectations (Economic theory) Game theory. Economic man. Decision making. Rational expectations (Economic theory)
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001 000000659641
005 20000308152246
008 970904s1998 maua b 001 0 eng
010 ▼a 97040481 //r98
020 ▼a 0262181878 (hardcover : alk. paper)
020 ▼a 0262681005 (pbk. : alk. paper)
040 ▼a DLC ▼c DLC ▼d UKM
049 ▼l 111149816
050 0 0 ▼a HD30.23 ▼b .R83 1998
082 0 0 ▼a 153.8/3 ▼2 21
090 ▼a 153.83 ▼b R896m
100 1 ▼a Rubinstein, Ariel.
245 1 0 ▼a Modeling bounded rationality / ▼c Ariel Rubinstein.
260 ▼a Cambridge, Mass. : ▼b MIT Press, ▼c c1998.
300 ▼a viii, 208 p. : ▼b ill. ; ▼c 24 cm.
440 0 ▼a Zeuthen lecture book series
504 ▼a Includes bibliographical references (p. [195]-201) and index.
650 0 ▼a Decision making.
650 0 ▼a Economic man.
650 0 ▼a Game theory.
650 0 ▼a Rational expectations (Economic theory)
650 4 ▼a Game theory.
650 4 ▼a Economic man.
650 4 ▼a Decision making.
650 4 ▼a Rational expectations (Economic theory)
950 1 ▼b US$ 20.34

Holdings Information

No. Location Call Number Accession No. Availability Due Date Make a Reservation Service
No. 1 Location Main Library/Western Books/ Call Number 153.83 R896m Accession No. 111149816 Availability In loan Due Date 2021-11-29 Make a Reservation Available for Reserve R Service M

Contents information

Table of Contents


CONTENTS
Series Foreword = ⅸ
Preface = xi
Introduction 1
 1 "Modeling" and "Bounded Rationality" = 1
 2 The Aim of This Book = 2
 3 The State of the Art = 3
 4 A Personal Note = 5
 5 Bibliographic Notes = 5
1 Bounded Rationality in Choice = 7
 1.1 The "Rational Man" = 7
 1.2 The Traditional Economist's Position = 10
 1.3 The Attack on the Traditional Approach = 13
 1.4 Experimental Evidence = 16
 1.5 Comments = 21
 1.6 Bibliographic Notes = 23
 1.7 Projects = 24
2 Modeling Procedural Decision Making = 25
 2.1 Motivation = 25
 2.2 Preparing the Tools : Similarity Relations = 28
 2.3 A Procedure of Choice Between Vectors = 29
 2.4 Analysis = 31
 2.5 Case-Based Theory = 34
 2.6 Bibliographic Notes = 37
 2.7 Projects = 37
3 Modeling Knowledge = 41
 3.1 Knowledge and Bounded Rationality = 41
 3.2 Information Structure = 41
 3.3 The Set-Theoretical Definition of Knowledge = 46
 3.4 Kripke's Model = 48
 3.5 The Impact of the Timing of Decisions and Having More Information = 52
 3.6 On the Possibility of Speculative Trade = 56
 3.7 Bibliographic Notes = 60
 3.8 Projects = 61
4 Modeling Limited Memory = 63
 4.1 Imperfect Recall = 63
 4.2 An Extensive Decision Making Model With Imperfect Information = 64
 4.3 Perfect and Imperfect Recall = 68
 4.4 Time Consistency = 70
 4.5 The Role of Randomization = 75
 4.6 The Multiselves Approach = 78
 4.7 On the Problematics of Using the Model = 81
 4.8 Bibliographic Notes = 84
 4.9 Projects = 84
5 Choosing What to Know = 87
 5.1 Optimal Information Structures = 87
 5.2 What Is "High" and What Is "Low"? = 89
 5.3 Manipulating Informational Restrictions = 93
 5.4 Perceptrons = 100
 5.5 Bivliographic Notes = 104
 5.6 Projects = 104
6 Modeling Complexity in Group Decisions = 107
 6.1 Introduction = 107
 6.2 The Model of a Team = 108
 6.3 Processing Information = 113
 6.4 Aggregating Preferences = 117
 6.5 Bibliographic Notes = 119
 6.6 Projects = 120
7 Modeling Bounded Rationality in Games = 121
 7.1 Introduction = 121
 7.2 Interaction Between Luce Players = 122
 7.3 A Game with Procedural Rational Players = 124
 7.4 Limited Foresight in Extensive Games = 129
 7.5 Bibliographic Notes = 135
 7.6 Projects = 135
8 Complexity Considerations in Repeated Games = 137
 8.1 Introduction = 137
 8.2 The Model of Repeated Games : A Brief Review = 138
 8.3 Strategies as Machines in Infinitely Rpeated Games = 143
 8.4 Complexity Considerations in Repeated Games = 149
 8.5 The Structure of Machine Game Equilibria = 152
 8.6 Repeated Extensive Games = 159
 8.7 Concluding Remarks = 161
 8.8 Bibliographic Notes = 163
 8.9 Projects = 163
9 Attempts to Resolve the Finite Horizon Paradoxes = 165
 9.1 Motivation = 165
 9.2 Implementation of Strategies by Machines = 166
 9.3 Counting Is Costly = 168
 9.4 Bounded Capability to Count = 169
 9.5 Machines Also Send Messages = 170
 9.6 The -Equilibrium Approach : A Deviation Is Costly = 172
 9.7 Conclusion = 173
 9.8 Bibliographic Notes = 174
 9.9 Projects = 174
10 Computability Constraints in Games = 175
 10.1 Introduction = 175
 10.2 Informal Results on Computability = 178
 10.3 Is There a Rational Player? = 181
 10.4 Turing Machine Game = 184
 10.5 Bibliographic Notes = 185
 10.6 Projects = 185
11 Final Thoughts = 187
 11.1 Simon's Critiqe = 187
 11.2 Response = 190
References = 195
Index = 203


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