CONTENTS
Tables = ⅶ
Acknowledgments = ⅸ
1 Introduction = 1
The Set of Case Studies = 6
Coverage of the Book and Organization = 15
The Targeted Readership = 18
2 Multiple Principals in Principal-Agent Analysis = 20
Analytic Framework = 20
Facts To Be Explained = 25
The Property Rights Model and the Basic Hypothesis = 32
History of Property Rights Over State-owned Enterprises = 39
Principal-Agent Analysis Applied to Supervision Over Enterprises = 44
Property Rights in General in the People's Republic of China = 48
Hierarchy Among Principals = 60
Appendix : Case Studies of Supervisory Authority Over Enterprises = 62
3 Planning As Coordination = 71
The Macroeconomic Setting = 72
Plan Fulfillment by the Individual Enterprise = 74
The Ratchet Effect Syndrome = 86
Hypothesis As To Planning = 87
Analysis of Sample Data = 89
Conclusion = 99
Appendix : Planning Materials on Individual Enterprises = 102
4 Multiple Prices and Equilibrium Price = 112
Stage Analysis of Industrial Procurement = 114
Procurement Data From the Sample = 122
Multiple Prices and Equilibrium Analysis = 148
Kornai's "Soft Budget Constraint" = 152
5 The Incentives Facing the Enterprises = 159
Incentives Specific to Upper Managers = 160
Incentives Common to the Labor Force As a Whole = 173
Conclusion = 186
Appendix : Regressions for Incentives Common to the Labor Force As a Whole = 191
6 Elements of Price = 199
Sales Tax and Profits = 200
Materials Purchases and Wages = 212
Conclusions = 220
7 Internal Organization of the Enterprise = 224
Party Committee versus Director Control Within the Enterprise = 224
Trade Unions, Workers' Congresses, and Democratic Management = 237
Foremen and Political Cadres = 240
8 Conclusion, Including Evaluations of Efficiency = 243
Thematic Summary = 243
Allocation of Labor and Determination of Wages = 253
The Pre-reform and Reform Years : Differences and Continuities = 256
Efficiency Evaluations = 260
Appendix : The Chinese Incentive System in State Industry = 274
Notes = 279
References = 335
Index = 341
