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Bureaucrats in business : the economics and politics of government ownership

Bureaucrats in business : the economics and politics of government ownership (Loan 1 times)

Material type
단행본
Corporate Author
World Bank.
Title Statement
Bureaucrats in business : the economics and politics of government ownership.
Publication, Distribution, etc
Oxford ;   New York :   Oxford University Press,   c1995.  
Physical Medium
xix, 346 p. : ill. (some col.) ; 24 cm.
Series Statement
A World Bank policy research report,1020-0851.
ISBN
0195211065 (alk. paper)
General Note
"Published for the World Bank."  
Bibliography, Etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references (p. 325-340) and index.
Subject Added Entry-Topical Term
Government ownership --Developing countries. Government business enterprises --Developing countries. Industrial efficiency --Developing countries. Socialism --Developing countries.
Subject Added Entry-Geographic Name
Developing countries --Economic conditions.
비통제주제어
Public sector, Economics,,
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008 950628s1995 enka b 001 0 eng
010 ▼a 95033961 //r96
015 ▼a GB96-5852
019 ▼a 34116189 ▼a 35665842
020 ▼a 0195211065 (alk. paper)
040 ▼a DLC ▼c DLC ▼d UKM
043 ▼a d------
049 1 ▼l 911000594 ▼f 국대원
050 0 0 ▼a HD4420.8 ▼b .B87 1995
082 0 0 ▼a 338.6/2/091724 ▼2 20
090 ▼a 338.62 ▼b B952
245 0 0 ▼a Bureaucrats in business : ▼b the economics and politics of government ownership.
260 ▼a Oxford ; ▼a New York : ▼b Oxford University Press, ▼c c1995.
300 ▼a xix, 346 p. : ▼b ill. (some col.) ; ▼c 24 cm.
440 2 ▼a A World Bank policy research report, ▼x 1020-0851.
500 ▼a "Published for the World Bank."
504 ▼a Includes bibliographical references (p. 325-340) and index.
650 0 ▼a Government ownership ▼z Developing countries.
650 0 ▼a Government business enterprises ▼z Developing countries.
650 0 ▼a Industrial efficiency ▼z Developing countries.
650 0 ▼a Socialism ▼z Developing countries.
651 0 ▼a Developing countries ▼x Economic conditions.
651 4 ▼a Developing countries ▼x Economic conditions.
653 0 ▼a Public sector ▼a Economics
653 0 ▼a Developing countries
710 2 ▼a World Bank.

Holdings Information

No. Location Call Number Accession No. Availability Due Date Make a Reservation Service
No. 1 Location Main Library/Graduate School of International Studies/ Call Number 338.62 B952 Accession No. 911000594 Availability Available Due Date Make a Reservation Service M

Contents information

Table of Contents


CONTENTS

Foreword = xi

The Report Team =xiii

Acknowledgments = xv

Definitions = xvii

Introduction and Overview = 1

 What Makes for Success in State Enterprise Reform? = 4

 Contracting : What Works, What Doesn't, and Why = 6

 The Politics of Reforming State-Owned Enterprises = 10

 What Can Be Done to Spur Reforms and Improve Outcomes? = 14

1 Bureaucrats Are Still in Business = 25

 State-Owned Enterprise Sector Remains Large Despite Increasing Divestiture = 25

 How SOEs Affect Economic Performance = 33

 Conclusion = 50

 Notes = 51

2 Success and Failure in SOE Reform = 55

 Measuring Success and Failure = 57

 What Reform Characteristics Distinguish Successful Reformers? = 66

 Divestiture and SOE Reform = 67

 Outgrowing stated-Owned Enterprises : An Alternative to Divestiture? = 71

 Divestiture Alone Is Seldom Enough = 75

 Improving SOE Performance through Competition = 76

 Hard Budgets = 81

 Financial Sector Reform = 86

 Changing the Relationship between Governments and SOE Managers = 93

 Conclusion = 95

 Appendix 2.1 : Reforms to Open SOE Markets to Competition and Introduce Hard Budget Constraints = 97

 Appendix 2.2 : Financial Sector Reform = 101

 Notes = 103

3 Contracting : What Works, What Doesn't, and Why = 107

 How Incentive Factors Interact to Influence Outcomes = 109

 Performance Contracts : With Public Managers = 112

 Management Contracts : With Private Managers = 133

 Regulatory Contracts : With Private Owners = 150

 Conclusion = 168

 Notes = 171

4 The Politics of SOE Reform = 175

 Assessing Condition Ⅰ : Political Desirability = 178

 Assessing Condition Ⅱ : The Political Feasibility of SOE Reform = 190

 Assessing Condition Ⅲ : The Credibility of State-Owned Enterprise Reform = 203

 Explaining and Predicting Reform Success = 215

 Conclusion =217

 Appendix 4.1 : The Politics of State-Owned Enterprise Reform : Additional Evidence = 218

 Notes = 227

5 How to Spur Reforms and Improve Outcomes = 231

 How to Tell Whether a Country Is Ready to Reform = 233

 What to Do in Countries Not Ready for SOE Reform = 237

 What to Do in Countries Ready for SOE Reform = 241

 What to Do with SOEs That Cannot Be Divested = 250

 Conclusion = 257

 Notes = 257

 Implications for Foreign Assistance = 259

 Statistical Appendix = 263

 References = 325

 Index = 341

Boxes

 1 How Foreign Aid Can Better Assist State-Owned Enterprise Reform = 17

  1.1  What Is a State-Owned Enterprise? = 26

  1.2  Welfare Consequences of Selling State-Owned Enterprises = 39

  1.3  Privation and Pollution = 41

 2.1 China's Ownership Patterns : Not State but Not Private = 66

 2.2 External Incentives and Corporate Behavior : The Case of Shepheard's Hotel = 67

 2.3 Getting the Most from Privatization = 72

 2.4 How China's Township and Village Enterprises Differ from State Enterprises = 74

 2.5 Uncovering Hidden Subsidies = 82

 2.6 Procurement Favors SOEs over Private Manufacturers in India = 85

 2.7 Roles of a Well Developed Financial System in SOE Reform = 87

 2.8 Measuring Financial Sector Development = 90

 2.9 The Financial Sector and SOE Reform : The Case of Poland = 91

 2.10 Weak Financial Regulation Can Undermine Privatization : The Case of Chile = 93

 3.1 Measuring SOE Performance : What about Social Goals? = 115

 3.2 Performance Contracts in China = 131

 3.3 Sri Lanks's Experience with Management Contracts = 140

 3.4 Price Cap and Benchmark Regulation = 160

 4.1 Indicators of Coalition Realignment : The Mexican Example = 182

 4.2 State Enterprise Reform in China = 189

 4.3 Compensation of Reform Losers in Chilean SOE Reforms = 196

 4.4 Mass Privatization through Vouchers in the Czech Republic = 202

 4.5 Measuring Credibility = 206

 4.6 Locking in Reform : Restraints on Executive Discretion in Chile = 211

 5.1 Getting Ready for Reform = 238

 5.2 Privatization Can Have Pitfalls = 244

 5.3 Guarantees and Privatization = 251

Tables

 1 Unmet Conditions in Less Than Successful SOE Reformers = 14

  1.1  Divestiture in Developing Countries, 1980-93 = 27

  1.2  Revenue from Divestiture in Developing Countries by Region and Sector, 1988-93 = 28

 2.1 Twelve Countries Undertaking State-Owned Enterprise Reform = 56

 2.2 Successful Reformers Divested More = 69

 2.3 Privation in Manufacturing = 70

 2.4a Prereform Status of Domestic Competition, Selected Industries = 78

 2.4b Postreform (1994) Status of Domestic Competition, Selected Industries = 79

 2.5 Measure of Foreign Competition = 80

 2.6 Government Transfers to State-Owned Enterprises (1978-91) and Price Regulation = 83

 2.7 Institutional Reforms of State-Owned Enterprises in the 1980s = 94

 3.1 Number of Performance Contracts in Developing Countries, by Sector = 112

 3.2 Case Study Enterprises = 114

 3.3 Comparison of Target Characteristics = 122

 3.4 Comparison of Contract Incentives = 125

 3.5 Instances of Government Reneging in Whole or in Part = 127

 3.6 Comparison of Performance with Selected Contract Characteristics = 132

 3.7 Management Contracts by Country = 135

 3.8 Management Contracts by Sector = 136

 3.9 Sample of Management Contracts = 137

 3.10 Summary of Outcomes = 138

 3.11 The Effects of Selection and Financing on Contract Performance = 146

 3.12 Value of Recent Infrastructure Privation in Developing Countries = 151

 3.13 Sample of Countries with Private Sector Participation in Telecommunications = 152

 3.14 Indicators of Quality of Telecommunications Service, before and after Reform = 155

 3.15 Mechanisms for Reveling Information about Telecommunications = 157

 3.16 Price Regulation in Sample Countries = 161

 3.17 Agencies Enforcing Regulations : Their Neutrality, Enforcement Powers, and Skills = 164

 4.1 Condition Ⅰ for State-Owned Enterprise Reform : Political Feasibility = 180

 4.2 Estimates of Overstaffing in State-Owned Enterprises = 192

 4.3 Condition Ⅱ for State-Owned Enterprise Reform : Political Feasibility = 193

 4.4 Condition Ⅲ for State-Owned Enterprise Reform : credibility = 208

 4.5 Unmet Conditions in Less Than Successful SOE Reformers = 216

Appendix tables

 A.1 Share of State-Owned Enterprises in Economic Activity, 1978-91 = 268

 A.2 Share of State-Owned Enterprises in Nonagricultural Economic Activity, 1978-91 = 272

 A.3 Share of State-Owned Enterprises Investment in Gross Domestic Investment, 1978-91 = 276

 A.4 State-Owned Investment as a Proportion of Gross Domestic Product, 1978-91 = 282

 A.5 Share of State-Owned Enterprises in Employment, 1978-91 = 288

 A.6 State-Owned Enterprises Overall Balances before Transfers as a Proportion of Gross Domestic Product, 1978-91 = 292

 A.7 Net Financial Flows from Government to State-Owned Enterprises as a Proportion of Gross Domestic Product, 1978-91 = 296

 A.8 Share of State-Owned Enterprises in Gross Domestic Credit, 1978-91 = 300

 A.9 Gross Domestic Credit to State-Owned Enterprises as a Proportion of Gross Domestic Product, 1978-91 = 304

 A.10 Share of State-Owned Enterprises in Total External Debt, 1978-91 = 308

 A.11 External Debt of State-Owned Enterprises as a Proportion of Gross Domestic Product, 1978-91 = 312

Figures

 1 A Decision Tree for State-Owned Enterprise Reform = 16

 1.1 Share of State-Owned Enterprises Investment in Gross Domestic Investment, by Region = 29

 1.2 Share of State-Owned Enterprises in Gross Domestic Product, by Region = 31

 1.3 Share of State-Owned Enterprises Employment in Total Employment, by Region = 32

 1.4 Three Measures of SOE Importance in Low-Income Economies = 34

 1.5 Pollution Abatement Efforts = 40

 1.6 Water Pollution Levels, by Age and ownership of Firm, Indonesia = 40

 1.7 State-Owned Enterprises Saving Minus Investment = 43

 1.8 Net Financial Transfers to State-Owned Enterprises as a Share of Gross Domestic product = 44

 1.9 State-Owned Enterprises Share in Gross Domestic Credit = 44

 1.10 State-Owned Enterprises share in Total External Debt = 45

 1.11 Explicit Operating Subsidies to State-Owned Enterprises = 48

 1.12 Indicators of State-Owned Enterprise Performance in Developing Countries = 49

 2.1 Financial performance of State-Owned Enterprises = 59

 2.2 Productivity of State-Owned Enterprises = 62

 2.3 Saving Minus Investment as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product = 63

 2.4 China : Growth Rates by Ownership Type = 73

 2.5 China : Response of State Sector to Competition from Nonstate Enterprises = 77

 2.6 Indicators of financial Sector Development, 1991 = 89

 3.1 Pre-and Postcontract Performance : Net Rate of Return on Revalued Assets = 116

 3.2 Pre-and Postcontract Performance : Labor Productivity = 117

 3.3 Pre-and Postcontract Performance : Total Factor Productivity = 119

 3.4 Performance Changes after the Introduction of Performance Contracts = 120

 3.5 Implementation of Management Contracts : Summary of Results = 139

 3.6 Contract Effects of Fee Structure, Autonomy, and Duration on performance = 142

 3.7 Telecommunications Reform : Impact on Network Expansion, Labor Productivity, and Returns = 154

 4.1 Net Aid Flows to Egypt = 185

 4.2 Net Aid Flows to Senegal = 187

 4.3 Chile : Employment Reduction in Selected State-Owned Enterprises = 195

 4.4 Ghana : Planned and Actual Employment Reductions in SOEs = 198

 5.1 A Decision Tree for State-Owned Enterprise Reform = 232

Box Figures

 1.2 Welfare Effects of Selling State-Owned Enterprises = 39

 1.3 SOE and Private Contribution to Pollution in Brazil = 41

 1.4 Financial Sector Development, 1991 = 90



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