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Human capital, employment and bargaining

Human capital, employment and bargaining (Loan 5 times)

Material type
단행본
Personal Author
Hart, Robert A. Moutos, Thomas.
Title Statement
Human capital, employment and bargaining / Robert A. Hart, Thomas Moutos.
Publication, Distribution, etc
Cambridge, England ;   New York, NY, USA :   Cambridge University Press,   1995.  
Physical Medium
xii, 204 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
ISBN
0521453267
Bibliography, Etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references (p. 188-198) and indexes.
Subject Added Entry-Topical Term
Human capital. Employment (Economic theory) Collective bargaining.
000 00862camuuu200277 a 4500
001 000000421249
003 OCoLC
005 19960919150823.0
008 s1995 enk 000 eng
010 ▼a 94032952
020 ▼a 0521453267
040 ▼a DLC ▼c DLC
049 1 ▼a ACCL ▼l 111066630
050 0 0 ▼a HD4904.7 ▼b .H33 1995
082 0 0 ▼a 331 ▼2 20
090 ▼a 331 ▼b H326h
100 1 ▼a Hart, Robert A.
245 1 0 ▼a Human capital, employment and bargaining / ▼c Robert A. Hart, Thomas Moutos.
260 ▼a Cambridge, England ; ▼a New York, NY, USA : ▼b Cambridge University Press, ▼c 1995.
300 ▼a xii, 204 p. : ▼b ill. ; ▼c 24 cm.
504 ▼a Includes bibliographical references (p. 188-198) and indexes.
650 0 ▼a Human capital.
650 0 ▼a Employment (Economic theory)
650 0 ▼a Collective bargaining.
700 1 0 ▼a Moutos, Thomas.

Holdings Information

No. Location Call Number Accession No. Availability Due Date Make a Reservation Service
No. 1 Location Main Library/Western Books/ Call Number 331 H326h Accession No. 111066630 Availability Available Due Date Make a Reservation Service B M

Contents information

Table of Contents


CONTENTS
Preface = xi
1 Overview = 1
 1.1 Motivation = 1
 1.2 Route map = 6
2 Labour demand and efficient contract models = 12
 2.1 Human capital investment and the marginal worker = 12
 2.2 The demand for workers and hours = 21
 2.3 Further topics in workers-hours demand = 26
 2.4 An efficient contract model = 37
 2.5 Concluding remark = 43
3 Turnover costs, firm-specific training and unemployment = 48
 3.1 Turnover costs and firm-specific training in a macroeconomic perspective = 48
 3.2 Excess labour and the business cycle = 50
 3.3 Turnover costs and unemployment = 55
 3.4 Firm-specific training and unemployment = 66
 3.5 Should training be subsidized? = 71
4 Employment and bargaining = 77
 4.1 Why bargaining? = 77
 4.2 Efficient and sequential bargains = 81
 4.3 Choice of bargaining mode = 91
5 Choice of compensation, unemployment insurance and policy issues = 96
 5.1 Context of chapter developments = 96
 5.2 Pure wage and Profit-sharing contracts under efficient bargaining = 97
 5.3 Tax structure and the choice of compensation system = 101
 5.4 Unemployment insurance and union bargaining = 110
 5.5 Bargaining and labour market policy = 116
 5.6 Assessment = 125
6 Team-related human capital and bargaining = 130
 6.1 Firm-specific human capital as a team investment = 130
 6.2 Team-related human capital and efficient bargaining = 133
 6.3 Specific human capital and ex-ante versus ex-post bargaining = 141
 6.4 General and specific human capital = 153
 6.5 Assessment = 156
7 Coalitional versus neoclassical firms = 163
 7.1 Organizational capital and the coalitional firm = 163
 7.2 Aoki's model of a coalitional firm = 165
 7.3 Neoclassical and participatory firms compared = 169
 7.4 The Japanese firm and the role of quasi-permanent employment = 173
 7.5 Coalitional and neoclassical firms compared = 180
8 Future developments = 184
Bibliography = 188
Index = 199


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