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Game theory (147회 대출)

자료유형
단행본
개인저자
Fudenberg, Drew. Tirole, Jean.
서명 / 저자사항
Game theory / Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole.
발행사항
Cambridge, Mass. :   MIT Press,   c1991.  
형태사항
xiii, 579 p. : ill. ; 27 cm.
ISBN
0262061414
서지주기
Includes bibliographical references and index.
일반주제명
Economics, Mathematical. Game theory.
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049 1 ▼l 412912946 ▼l 412919132 ▼l 911000807 ▼f 국대원
050 0 0 ▼a HB144 ▼b .F83 1991
082 0 0 ▼a 658.4/0353 ▼2 23
084 ▼a 658.4 ▼2 DDCK
090 ▼a 658.4 ▼b F952g
100 1 ▼a Fudenberg, Drew.
245 1 0 ▼a Game theory / ▼c Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole.
260 ▼a Cambridge, Mass. : ▼b MIT Press, ▼c c1991.
300 ▼a xiii, 579 p. : ▼b ill. ; ▼c 27 cm.
504 ▼a Includes bibliographical references and index.
650 0 ▼a Economics, Mathematical.
650 0 ▼a Game theory.
700 1 ▼a Tirole, Jean.

No. 소장처 청구기호 등록번호 도서상태 반납예정일 예약 서비스
No. 1 소장처 중앙도서관/국제대학원/ 청구기호 658.4 F952g 등록번호 911000807 도서상태 대출가능 반납예정일 예약 서비스 M
No. 2 소장처 중앙도서관/서고7층/ 청구기호 658.4 F952g 등록번호 111713615 도서상태 대출가능 반납예정일 예약 서비스 B M
No. 3 소장처 중앙도서관/서고7층/ 청구기호 658.4 F952g 등록번호 412912946 도서상태 대출가능 반납예정일 예약 서비스 B M
No. 4 소장처 중앙도서관/서고7층/ 청구기호 658.4 F952g 등록번호 412919132 도서상태 대출가능 반납예정일 예약 서비스 B M
No. 5 소장처 과학도서관/Sci-Info(2층서고)/ 청구기호 658.4 F952g 등록번호 121224460 도서상태 대출중 반납예정일 2022-10-21 예약 예약가능 R 서비스 M
No. 소장처 청구기호 등록번호 도서상태 반납예정일 예약 서비스
No. 1 소장처 중앙도서관/국제대학원/ 청구기호 658.4 F952g 등록번호 911000807 도서상태 대출가능 반납예정일 예약 서비스 M
No. 2 소장처 중앙도서관/서고7층/ 청구기호 658.4 F952g 등록번호 111713615 도서상태 대출가능 반납예정일 예약 서비스 B M
No. 3 소장처 중앙도서관/서고7층/ 청구기호 658.4 F952g 등록번호 412912946 도서상태 대출가능 반납예정일 예약 서비스 B M
No. 4 소장처 중앙도서관/서고7층/ 청구기호 658.4 F952g 등록번호 412919132 도서상태 대출가능 반납예정일 예약 서비스 B M
No. 소장처 청구기호 등록번호 도서상태 반납예정일 예약 서비스
No. 1 소장처 과학도서관/Sci-Info(2층서고)/ 청구기호 658.4 F952g 등록번호 121224460 도서상태 대출중 반납예정일 2022-10-21 예약 예약가능 R 서비스 M

컨텐츠정보

저자소개

장 티롤(지은이)

2014년 노벨 경제학상을 수상한 프랑스의 경제학자다. 게임이론과 산업조직론의 대가로 알려져 있다. 파리 9대학교에서 수학 박사 학위를, 미국 매사추세츠 공과대학교(MIT)에서 경제학 박사 학위를 받았다. 현재 툴루즈 경제대학교(TSE) 교수이자 MIT 초빙 교수로 활동하고 있다.

Drew Fudenberg(지은이)

정보제공 : Aladin

목차


CONTENTS
Acknowledgments = xv
Introduction = xvii
Ⅰ Static Games of Complete Information = 1
 1 Games in Strategic Form and Nash Equilibrium = 3
  1.1 Introduction to Games in Strategic Form and Iterated Strict Dominance = 4
   1.1.1 Strategic - Form Games = 4
   1.1.2 Dominated Strategies = 4
   1.1.3 Applications of the Elimination of Dominated Strategies = 9
  1.2 Nash Equilibrium = 11
   1.2.1 Definition of Nash Equilibrium = 11
   1.2.2 Examples of Pure - Strategy Equilibria = 14
   1.2.3 Nonexistence of a Pure - Strategy Equilibrium = 16
   1.2.4 Multiple Nash Equilibria, Focal Points, and Pareto Optimality = 18
   1.2.5 Nash Equilibrium as the Result of Learning or Evolution = 23
  1.3 Existence and Properties of Nash Equilibria = 29
   1.3.1 Existence of a Mixed - Strategy Equilibrium = 29
   1.3.2 The Nash - Equilibrium Correspondence Has a Closed Graph = 30
   1.3.3 Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Infinite Games with Continuous Payoffs = 34
   Exercises = 36
   References = 42
 2 Iterated Strict Dominance, Rationalizability, and Correlated Equilibrium = 45
  2.1 Iterated Strict Dominance and Rationalizability = 45
   2.1.1 Iterated Strict Dominance : Definition and Properties = 45
   2.1.2 An Application of Iterated Strict Dominance = 47
   2.1.3 Rationalizability = 48
   2.1.4 Raitonalizability and Iterated Strict Dominance = 50
   2.1.5 Discussion = 53
  2.2 Correlated Equilibrium = 53
  2.3 Rationalizability and Subjective Correlated Equilibria = 59
   Exercises = 60
   References = 63
Ⅱ Dynamic Games of Complete Information = 65
 3 Extensive - Form Games = 67
  3.1 Introduction = 67
  3.2 Commitment and Perfection in Multi - Stage Games with Observed Actions = 70
   3.2.1 What is a Multi - Stage Game? = 70
   3.2.2 Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection = 72
   3.2.3 The Value of Commitment and "Time Consistency" = 74
  3.3 The Extensive Form = 77
   3.3.1 Definition = 77
   3.3.2 Multi - stage Games with Observed Actions = 82
  3.4 Strategies and Equilibria in Extensive - Form Games = 83
   3.4.1 Behavior Strategies = 83
   3.4.2 The Strategic - Form Representation of Extensive - Form Games = 85
   3.4.3 The Equivalence between Mixed and Behavior Strategies in Games of Perfect Recall = 87
   3.4.4 Iterated Strict Dominance and Nash Equilibrium = 90
  3.5 Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection = 92
  3.6 Critiques of Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection = 96
   3.6.1 Critiques of Backward Induction = 97
   3.6.2 Critiques of Subgame Perfection = 99
   Exercises = 100
   References = 105
 4 Applications of Multi - Stage Games with Observed Actions = 107
  4.1 Introduction = 107
  4.2 The Principle of Optimality and Subgame Perfection = 108
  4.3 A First Look at Repeated Games = 110
   4.3.1 The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma = 110
   4.3.2 A Finitely Repeated Game with Several Static Equilibria = 112
  4.4 The Rubinstein - St$$\mathop a\limits \circ $$hl Bargaining Model = 113
   4.4.1 A Subgame - Perfect Equilibrium = 113
   4.4.2 Uniquenss of the Infinite - Horizon Equilibrium = 115
   4.4.3 Comparative Statics = 116
  4.5 Simple Timing Games = 117
   4.5.1 Definition of Simple Timing Games = 117
   4.5.2 The War of Attrition = 120
   4.5.3 Preemption Games = 126
  4.6 Iterated Conditional Dominance and the Rubinstein Bargaining Game = 128
  4.7 Open - Loop and Closed - Loop Equilibria = 130
   4.7.1 Definitions = 130
   4.7.2 A Two - Period Example = 132
   4.7.3 Open - Loop and Closed - Loop Equilibria in Games with Many Players = 133
  4.8 Finite - Horizon and Infinite - Horizon Equilibria = 134
   Exercises = 138
   References = 141
 5 Repeated Games = 145
  5.1 Repeated Games with Observable Actions = 146
   5.1.1 The Model = 146
   5.1.2 The Folk Theorem for Infinitely Repeated Games = 150
   5.1.3 Characterization of the Equilibrium Set = 160
  5.2 Finitely Repeated Games = 165
  5.3 Repeated Games with Varying Opponents = 168
   5.3.1 Repeated Games with Long - Run and Short - Run Players = 168
   5.3.2 Games with Overlapping Generations of Players = 171
   5.3.3 Randomly Matched Opponents = 172
  5.4 Pareto Perfection and Renegotiation - Proofness in Repeated Games = 174
   5.4.1 Introduction = 174
   5.4.2 Pareto Perfection in Finitely Repeated Games = 176
   5.4.3 Renegotiation - Proofness in Infinitely Repeated Games = 179
  5.5 Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Information = 182
   5.5.1 The model = 183
   5.5.2 Trigger - Price Strategies = 185
   5.5.3 Public Strategies and Public Equilibria = 187
   5.5.4 Dynamic Programming and Self - Generation = 188
  5.6 The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information = 192
  5.7 Changing the Information Structure with the Time Period = 197
   Exercises = 200
   References = 203
Ⅲ Static Games of Incomplete Information = 207
 6 Bayesian Games and Bayesian Equilibrium = 209
  6.1 Incomplete Information = 209
  6.2 Example 6. 1 : Providing a Public Good under Incomplete Information = 211
  6.3 The Notions of Type and Strategy = 213
  6.4 Bayesian Equilibrium = 215
  6.5 Further Examples of Bayesian Equilibria = 215
  6.6 Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies = 226
   6.6.1 Interim vs. Ex Ante Dominance = 226
   6.6.2 Examples of Iterated Strict Dominance = 228
  6.7 Using Bayesian Equilibria to Justify Mixed Equilibria = 230
   6.7.1 Examples = 230
   6.7.2 Purification Theorem = 233
  6.8 The Distributional Approach = 234
   Exercises = 237
   References = 241
 7 Bayesian Games and Mechanism Design = 243
  7.1 Examples of Mechanism Design = 246
   7.1.1 Nonlinear Pricing = 246
   7.1.2. Auctions = 250
  7.2 Mechanism Design and the Revelation Principle = 253
   7.3.1 Implementable Decisions and Allocations = 258
   7.3.2 Optimal Mechanisms = 262
  7.4 Mechanisms with Several Agents : Feasible Allocations, Budget Balance, and Efficiency = 268
   7.4.1 Feasibility under Budget Balance = 269
   7.4.2 Dominant Strategy vs. Bayesian Mechanisms = 270
   7.4.3 Efficiency Theorems = 271
   7.4.4 Inefficiency Theorems = 275
   7.4.5 Efficiency Limit Theorems = 279
   7.4.6 Strong Inefficiency Limit Theorems = 281
  7.5 Mechanism Design with Several Agents : Optimization = 284
   7.5.1 Auctions = 284
   7.5.2 Efficient Bargaining Processes = 288
  7.6 Further Topics in Mechanism Design = 292
   7.6.1 Correlated Types = 292
   7.6.2 Risk Aversion = 295
   7.6.3 Informed Principal = 297
   7.6.4 Dynamic Mechanism Design = 299
   7.6.5 Common Agency = 301
   Appendix = 303
   Exercises = 308
   References = 314
Ⅳ Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information = 319
 8 Equilibrium Refinements : Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, Sequential Equilibrium, and Trembling - Hand Perfection = 321
  8.1 Introduction 321
  8.2 Perfect Bayesin Equilibrium in Multi - Stage Games of Incomplete Information = 324
   8.2.1 The Basic Signaling Game = 324
   8.2.2 Examples of Signaling Games = 326
   8.2.3 Multi - Stage Games with Observed Actions and Incomplete Information = 331
  8.3 Extensive - Form Refinements = 336
   8.3.1 Review of Game Trees = 336
   8.3.2 Sequential Equilibrium = 337
   8.3.3 Properties of Sequential Equilibrium = 341
   8.3.4 Sequential Equilibrium Compared with Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium = 345
  8.4 Strategic - Form Refinements = 350
   8.4.1 Trembling - Hand Perfect Equilibrium = 351
   8.4.2 Proper Equilibrium = 356
   Appendix = 359
   Exercises = 360
   References = 364
 9 Reputation Effects = 367
  9.1 Introduction = 367
  9.2 Games with a Single Long - Run Player = 369
   9.2.1 The Chain = Store Game = 369
   9.2.2 Reputation Effects with a Single Long - Run Player : The General Case = 374
   9.2.3 Extensive - Form Stage Games = 381
  9.3 Games with Many Long - Run Players = 384
   9.3.1 General Stage Games and General Reputations = 384
   9.3.2 Common - Interest Games and Bounded - Recall Reputations = 386
  9.4 A Single "Big" Player against Many Simultaneous Long - Lived Opponents = 389
   Exercises = 391
   References = 394
 10 Sequential Bargaining under Incomplete Information = 397
  10.1 Introduction = 397
  10.2 Intertemporal Price Discrimination : The Single - Sale Model = 400
   10.2.1 The Framework = 400
   10.2.2 A Two - Period Introduction to Coasian Dynamics = 402
   10.2.3 An Infinite - Horizon Example of the Coase Conjecture = 405
   10.2.4 The Skimming Property = 406
   10.2.5 The Gap Case = 408
   10.2.6 The No - Gap Case = 411
   10.2.7 Gap vs. No Gap and Extensions of the Single - Sale Model = 414
  10.3 Intertemporal Price Discrimination : The Rental or Repeated - Sale Model = 416
   10.3.1 Short-Term Contracts = 417
   10.3.2 Long - Term Constracts and Renegotiation = 419
  10.4 Price Offers by an Informed Buyer = 421
   10.4.1 One - Sided Offers and Bilateral Asymmetric Information = 422
   10.4.2 Alternating Offers and One - Sided Asymmetric Information = 424
   10.4.3 Mechanism Design and Bargaining = 427
   Exercises = 428
   References = 432
Ⅴ Advanced Topics
 11 More Equilibrium Refinements : Stability, Forward Induction, and Iterated Weak Dominance = 437
  11.1 Strategic Stability = 437
  11.2 Signaling Games = 446
  11.3 Forward Induction, Iterated Weak Dominance, and "Burning Money" = 460
  11.4 Robust Predictions under Payoff Uncertainty = 467
   Exercises = 473
   References = 475
 12 Advanced Topics in Strategic - Form Games = 479
  12.1 Generic Properties of Nash Equilibria = 479
   12.1.1 Number of Nash Equilibria = 479
   12.1.2 Robustness of Equilibria to Payoff Perturbations = 480
  12.2 Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Games with Continuous Action Spaces and Discontinuous Payoffs = 484
   12.2.1 Existence of a Pure - Strategy Equilibrium = 485
   12.2.2 Existence of a Mixed - Strategy Equilibrium = 487
  12.3 Supermodular Games = 489
   Exercises = 497
   References = 498
 13 Payoff - Relevant Strategies and Markov Equilibrium = 501
  13.1 Markov Equilibria in Specific Classes of Games = 503
   13.1.1 Stochastic Games : Definition and Existence of MPE = 503
   13.1.2 Separable Sequential Games = 505
   13.1.3 Examples from Economics = 507
  13.2 Markov Perfect Equilibrium in General Games : Definition and Properties = 513
   13.2.1 Definition = 513
   13.2.2 Existence = 515
   13.2.3 Robustness to Payoff Perturbations = 518
  13.3 Differential Games = 520
   13.3.1 Definition = 520
   13.3.2 Equilibrium Conditions = 521
   13.3.3 Linear - Quadratic Differential Games = 523
   13.3.4 Zero - Sum Differential Games = 527
  13.4 Capital - Accumulation Games = 528
   13.4.1 Open - Loop, Closed - Loop, and Markov Strategies = 529
   13.4.2 Differential - Game Strategies = 534
   Exercises = 536
   References = 537
 14 Common Knowledge and Games = 541
  14.1 Introduction = 541
  14.2 Knowledge and Common Knowledge = 542
  14.3 Common Knowledge and Equilibrium = 546
   14.3.1 The Dirty Faces and the Sage = 547
   14.3.2 Agreeing to Disagree = 548
   14.3.3 No - Speculation Theorems = 550
   14.3.4 Interim Efficiency and Incomplete Contracts = 554
  14.4 Common Knowledge, Almost Common Knowledge, and the Sensitivity of Equilibria to the Information Structure = 554
   14.4.1 The Lack of Lower Hemi - Continuity = 556
   14.4.2 Lower Hemi - Continuity and Almost Common Knowledge = 562
   Exercises = 570
   References = 571
Index = 573


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