CONTENTS
List of figures and tables = xi
Preface = XV
Part Ⅰ Introduction = 1
1 What is to be explained? some preliminaries = 3
1.0 Introduction = 3
1.1 Some history and a look ahead = 4
1.2 What is to be explained? A first definition of the topic = 13
1.3 Some attempts to understand conscious experience = 28
1.4 Unconscious specialized processors : A gathering consensus = 43
1.5 Some common themes in this book = 64
1.6 Chapter summary and a look ahead = 70
Part Ⅱ The basic model = 71
2 Model 1 : Conscious representations are internally consistent and globally distributed = 73
2.0 Introduction = 73
2.1 Contrasting the capabilities of conscious and unconscious processes = 74
2.2 The basic model : A global workspace(blackboard) in a distributed system of intelligent information processors = 86
2.3 How the theoretical metaphor fits the evidence of Table 2,1 = 89
2.4 Input properties of the global workspace = 96
2.5 Output properties of the global workspace : How global is global? = 99
2.6 Further considerations = 104
2.7 Testable predictions and counterarguments = 108
2.8 Chapter summary = 117
3 The neural basis of conscious experience = 119
3.0 Introduction = 119
3.1 The neuroPhysiological fit with Model 1 = 121
3.2 Extensions suggested by the neurophysiology = 128
3.3 Recent refinements of the neurophysiological evidence = 131
3.4 Chapter summary = 134
Part Ⅲ The fundamental role of context = 135
4 Model 2 : Unconscious contexts shape conscious experience = 137
4.0 Introduction = 137
4.1 Sources of evidence on contexts = 139
4.2 Several kinds of contexts = 151
4.3 Modeling contextual knowledge = 161
4.4 Some plausible properties of contexts = 166
4.5 Implications for empirical testing = 173
4.6 Chapter summary = 176
5 Model 3 : Conscious experience is informative - it always demands some degree of adaptation = 177
5.0 Introduction : Information and adaptation = 177
5.1 The adaptation cycle : Any learnable task goes from context - creation to conscious information to redundancy = 184
5.2 Human beings also seek information at many levels = 199
5.3 Model 3 :Interpreting informativeness in the theory = 203
5.4 When repeated experiences do not fade : Is informativeness a necessary condition for conscious experience? = 208
5.5 Implications for learning = 213
5.6 Some experimental predictions = 219
5.7 0ther implications = 220
5.8 Chapter summary = 221
Part Ⅳ Goals and voluntary control = 223
6 Mode1 4 : Goal contexts, spontaneous problem solving, and the stream of consciousness = 225
6.0 Introduction = 225
6.1 The tip-of-the-tongue state as a goal context or intention = 226
6.2 The conscious - unconscious - conscious(CUC) triad = 233
6.3 Empirical assessment of goal contexts = 239
6.4 Goal contexts and the stream of consciousness = 240
6.5 Further implications = 243
6.6 Chapter summary = 245
7 Model 5 : Volition as ideomotor control of thought and action = 246
7.0 Introduction = 246
7.1 Is there a problem of volition? Some contrasts between similar voluntary and involuntary actions = 248
7.2 Voluntary action resembles spontaneous problem solving = 257
7.3 Model 5 : The ideomotor theory in modern garb = 259
7.4 Evidence bearing on the ideomotor theory = 267
7.5 Explaining the voluntary - involuntary contrasts = 273
7.6 wider implications = 279
7.7 Absorption and hypnosis as ideomotor events = 287
7.8 Conflicts between goals = 292
7.9 Chapter summary = 296
Part V Attention, self, and conscious self - monitoring = 299
8 Model 6 : Attention as control of access to consciousness = 301
8.0 Introduction : Attention versus consciousness = 301
8.1 Voluntary and automatic control of access to consciousness = 305
8.2 Modeling voluntary and automatic access control = 307
8.3 Directing attention toward something = 314
8.4 Directing attention away from something : Suppression, repression, and emotional conflict = 317
8.5 Further implications = 321
8.6 Chapter summary = 324
9 Model 7 : Self as the dominant context of experience and action = 325
9.0 Introduction = 325
9.1 Contrasting self and not - self experiences = 331
9.2 Modeling self and self - concept = 336
9.3 Further questions to explore = 341
9.4 Chapter summary = 344
Part Ⅵ Consciousness is functional = 345
10 The functions of consciousness = 347
10.0 Introduction = 347
10.1 Definitional and Context - setting Function = 350
10.2 Adaptation and Learning Function = 351
10.3 Editing, Flagging. and Debugging Function = 351
10.4 Recruiting and Control Function = 352
10.5 Prioritzing and Access - control Function = 352
10.6 Decision - making or Executive Function = 353
10.7 Analogy - forming Function = 353
10.8 Metacognitive or Self - monitoring Function = 354
10.9 Autoprogramming and Self - maintenance Function = 355
10.10 Chapter summary = 356
Part Ⅶ Conclusion = 357
11 A summary and some future directions = 359
11.0 Introduction = 359
11.1 Overall review = 359
11.2 A brief review of the models = 360
11.3 What are the necessary conditions for cons experience? = 362
11.4 Some practical implications of GW theory = 364
11.5 Topics not covered in this volume = 364
11.6 Philosophical implications : The mind - body problem revisited = 365
11.7 Future directions for research and theory = 365
Glossary and guide to theoretical claims = 367
References = 393
Name index = 411
Subject index = 416
Flgure 1.1 The continuum of clear and fuzzy events = 12
Flgure 1.2 The Sporting Experiment : Momentary conscious events may be difficult to recall = 16
Flgure 1.3 The Pani Experiment : Predictable mental images become unconscious with practice = 23
Flgure 1.4 Similarities between GW terms and other widespread concepts = 44
Flgure 1.5 The Sokolov argument : Habituated stimuli are still represented in the nervous system = 47
Flgure 1.6 The standard linguistic hierarchy = 58
Flgure 2.1 Trade-offs to maintain consistency in the Ames distorted room = 80
Flgure 2.2 Conscious experiences are always internally consistent = 82
Flgure 2.3 Model 1 : A global workspace in a distributed system = 88
Flgure 2.4 Some time parameters of conscious experience and recall = 98
Flgure 2.5 The Mind's Senses as a global workspace equivalent = 105
Flgure 3.1 The ERTAS : A neural global workspace? = 124
Flgure 3.2 One possible scenario : Cortical centers competing for access to ERTAS = 127
Flgure 3.3 Model 1A : Some changes in the theory suggested by the neurophysiology = 132
Flgure 4.1 Priming effects : Conscious events increase access to similar events = 141
Flgure 4.2 Presuppositions of the concept of "buying" that may become consciolls upon violation = 150
Flgure 4.3 A significance hierarchy of goal contexts = 157
Flgure 4.4 Modeling contextual knowledge = 162
Flgure 4.5 Model 2 : Contexts compete and cooperate to influence conscious experience = 166
